



Alternative Means Jurisprudence in Kansas: Why 
Wright is Wrong 
William R. Mott* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Untied from any mooring, alternative means jurisprudence in Kansas 
has drifted into a strange and confusing world where “secondary matters” 
infest every corner of the criminal code.  Who knew the Kansas legislature 
intended to create a class system for criminal elements in this state?  A 
breakdown in the application of Kansas’s ordinary canons of statutory and 
constitutional construction is to blame.
1
  This breakdown has led the state 
into a morass of artificial and unnecessary distinctions impossible to 
otherwise conceive.  Any discussion about the breakdown now begins with 




An “alternative means” case arises when the court’s instructions give 
the jury the option of convicting a defendant of a single offense under two or 
more statutory means.
3
  In such a case, “there must be jury unanimity as to 
guilt for the single crime charged.  Unanimity is not required, however, as to 
the means by which the crime was committed so long as substantial 
evidence supports each alternative means.”
4
  This “super sufficiency” 
requirement emerged as the undisputed law of Kansas in 2010 with the 
Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Wright.
5
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        1.  “[C]anons are not mandatory rules.  They are guides that ‘need not be conclusive.’”  
Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (citation omitted).  Nevertheless, their 
application “provides some degree of insulation against judicial arbitrariness [and render] statutory 
interpretation more predictable, regular, and coherent.”  William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey, Forward: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 66 (1994).  
 2. 224 P.3d 1159 (Kan. 2010). 
 3.  Id. at 1164. 
 4.  Id. at 1165 (quoting State v. Timley, 875 P.2d 242, 246 (Kan. 1994)). 
 5.  Id. 
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A.  Visualizing the Concept: Alternative Means v. Secondary Matters 
Because alternative means errors can only occur through the trial court’s 
instructions to a jury, a sample instruction can illustrate the distinction the 
Kansas Supreme Court makes between “alternative means” and “secondary 
matters.”  Consider the example kidnapping instruction below in which the 
boldface type signifies “alternative means” and the italics represent what the 
court has dubbed “secondary matters,” or “options within a means.”
6
 
To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: 
1.  The defendant took or confined John Doe by force, threat, or 
deception. 
2.  The defendant did so with the intent to hold John Doe to facilitate 
flight or the commission of any crime. 
3.  This act occurred on or about the 1st day of January, 2013, in 
Sumner County, Kansas. 
Jurors given this instruction must, pursuant to element number one, 
determine if the state sufficiently proved the defendant “took or confined” 
the alleged victim.  It matters not that half of the jurors might rely on the 
“taking” theory while the other half might rely on the “confining” theory, so 




What happens if the evidence does not sufficiently support the “taking” 
theory?  The conviction will be overturned because Wright holds that when 
one of the means submitted to the jury is factually inadequate, harmless error 
analysis will not be applied.
8
  According to Wright’s holding, this guarantees 
unanimity in verdicts “at the level of factual generality that matters most of 
all: guilt v. innocence.”
9
  Requiring both the “taking” and the “confining” 
theories to be sufficiently proved beyond a reasonable doubt is what the 
court means by the phrase super sufficiency. 
While the Kansas Supreme Court requires super sufficiency for “taking 
or confining,” the terms “by force, threat, or deception” were deemed 
                                                          
 6.  See State v. Brown, 284 P.3d 977, 992 (Kan. 2012) (using terms “secondary matters” and 
“options within a means”). 
 7.  State v. Haberlein, 290 P.3d 640, 649 (Kan. 2012). 
        8.  Wright, 224 P.3d at 1167. 
 9.  Id. at 1167 (quoting Carol A. Beier, Lurching Toward the Light: Alternative Means and 
Multiple Acts Law in Kansas, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 275, 299 (2005)). 
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“secondary matters” not requiring super sufficiency.
10
  So, what happens if 
the evidence does not sufficiently support the “threat” and “deception” 
theories?  The conviction stands as long as the evidence sufficiently supports 
one of the theories, which, in the example, is the “force” theory.
11
  
Currently, errors of this sort involving secondary matters—or options within 
means—do not merit application of any harmless error analysis.  Instead, the 
conviction is summarily affirmed without exploration of potential harm 
involved.  In simpler terms, the court spliced the “actus reus”
12
 of 
kidnapping contained in element one of the instruction into two sections and 
applied a different rule for each section.  If this result does not seem obvious 
to you, you are not alone.
13
  The inspiration for this article began with sheer 
curiosity at how the exotic holdings in this area of Kansas law came to exist. 
This  article reviews the historical origins of alternative means law in 
Kansas, critiques the court’s holdings, and proposes an alternative to the 
current state of the law through ordinary application of Kansas’s canons of 
statutory and constitutional construction. 
II.  HISTORY OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS IN KANSAS 
A.  Jury Unanimity at the Common Law 
Kansas adopted the common law at its inception by legislative 
enactment.
14
  The centuries-old rule requiring verdicts to be unanimous is 
                                                          
 10.  Haberlein, 290 P.3d at 649. 
 11. See id. (“But the phrase ‘force, threat, or deception’ addresses secondary matter, merely 
describing ways in which the actus reus can be accomplished.  In other words, under our Brown 
analysis, each is an option within the means of taking or confining.”). 
  12.  Actus reus means: “‘guilty act’ . . . [t]he wrongful deed that comprises the physical 
components of a crime and that generally must be coupled with mens rea to establish criminal 
liability; a forbidden act.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 41 (Deluxe 9th ed. 2009).   
 13.  Applying Wright’s rule, “[i]n its brief . . . the State conceded that force, threat, and 
deception were alternative means” of proving kidnapping in Haberlein.  290 P.3d at 648–49.  
Naturally, this was before State v. Brown opined that there existed “secondary matters” for which 
Wright’s rule does not apply.  284 P.3d 977, 990–91 (Kan. 2012).   
 14.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-109 (2012) (“The common law as modified by constitutional 
and statutory law, judicial decisions, and the conditions and wants of the people, shall remain in 
force in aid of the General Statutes of this state; but the rule of the common law, that statutes in 
derogation thereof shall be strictly construed, shall not be applicable to any general statute of this 
state, but all such statutes shall be liberally construed to promote their object.”).  See also Addington 
v. State, 431 P.2d 532, 539 (Kan. 1967) (quoting Kan. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nichols, Kennedy & Co., 9 
Kan. 235, 252 (1872)) (“We get our common law from England.  It dates back to the fourth year of 
the reign of James the First, or 1607, when the first English settlement was founded in this country at 
Jamestown, Virginia.  The body of laws of England as they then existed now constitute our common 
law.  It is so fixed by statute in this state. . . .” (citation omitted)); Gonzales v. Atchison Topeka & 
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 371 P.2d 193, 198 (Kan. 1962) (“From the beginning of our history as a state the 
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deeply engrained in the common law
15
 and has always been the law of 
Kansas in criminal cases.  While the Kansas legislature has statutorily 
altered the common law unanimity rule in civil cases,
16
 it has not done so in 
criminal cases. 
Like the common law right to juror unanimity in verdicts,
17
 the issue of 
juror unanimity in alternative means cases is far from new.
18
  For centuries, 
the well-settled common law rule provided that, when a jury was given 
alternative means of finding a defendant guilty of a crime, and one of the 
means was not supported by the evidence, the conviction stood on the 
presumption that juries are well-equipped to analyze evidence; jury 
intelligence would save a defendant from conviction on a theory 
unsupported by the evidence.
19
  This presumption remained “in the absence 
of anything in the record to show the contrary.”
20
  Using the parlance of 
current Kansas courts, the common law rule does not require “super 
sufficiency.” 
In 1926, State v. Bryan became the first Kansas case to deploy the 
common law alternative means rule—albeit in dicta—when it analyzed a 
complaint that the trial court held was “bad for duplicity.”
21
  That is, the trial 
court held the mistaken notion that the complaint alleged two separate 
                                                          
common law of England has been the basis of the law of this state, and except as modified by 
constitutional or statutory provisions, by judicial decisions, or by the wants and needs of the people, 
it has continued to remain the law of this state.” (citations omitted)). 
 15.  See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 407–08 (1972) (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 375–76 (1st ed. 1768)) (“[T]he requirement of 
unanimity arose during the Middle Ages and had become an accepted feature of the common-law 
jury by the 18th century.”). 
 16.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-248(g) (providing that the agreement of ten of twelve “jurors is 
sufficient to render a verdict” in civil cases). 
 17.  It is often stated in Kansas Supreme Court opinions that “jury unanimity . . . in criminal 
cases is statutorily required.”  See State v. Wright, 224 P.3d 1159, 1164 (Kan. 2010) (citing K.S.A. 
22-3421, the verdict procedure statute, as the statutory source for the criminal unanimity rule).  
Another statute, K.S.A. 77-109, adopts the common law as Kansas law, which would include the 
requirement of unanimity in verdicts. 
 18.  See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 49 (1991) (“It was settled law in England before 
the Declaration of Independence, and in this country long afterwards, that a general jury verdict was 
valid so long as it was legally supportable on one of the submitted grounds-even [sic] though that 
gave no assurance that a valid ground, rather than an invalid one, was actually the basis for the jury’s 
action.”).   
 19.  See id. at 58 (finding petitioner’s invitation to alter the common law rule to only apply 
“where one can be sure that the jury did not use the inadequately supported ground as the basis of 
conviction” to be “without foundation in the commonlaw [sic] presumption upon which [the old 
common law rule] is based”). 
 20.  Id. at 49–50 (quoting Claassen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140, 146–47 (1891)). 
 21.  245 P. 102, 103–04 (Kan. 1926). The main issue for review was whether the trial court 
improperly quashed a complaint; the actual case never made it to the jury. Id. 
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crimes in “one count.”
22
  In Bryan, the defendant was charged with robbery 
and extortion of money—covered by the same criminal statute at the time—
by two means prohibited by Kansas law: (1) threatening to accuse another of 
a felony, or (2) threatening to do injury to a person.
23
  The trial court 
quashed the State’s complaint because it felt the “essential of unanimity” 
could be compromised if the jury was given the option of convicting the 
defendant under two means of committing the crime.
24
  In reversing the trial 
court, the Kansas Supreme Court stated that it mattered not that the crime 
was committed by “one or more of the alleged means.  There must be 
unanimity that extortion was committed or attempted through intimidation, 
and that is as far as the court is required to go in the instructions as to 
unanimity in the mental operations of the jurors in reaching a verdict.”
25
  
One can clearly see the common law rule’s influence in the Kansas Supreme 
Court’s ruling. 
1.  The Historical Seeds of Common Law Abrogation 
A half decade after Bryan, the United States Supreme Court issued its 
opinion in Stromberg v. California,
26
 which became, as the Court would 
later state, the “fountainhead of decisions departing from the common law” 
in alternative means cases.
27
  In Stromberg, the Court addressed the validity 
of a general verdict that rested on an instruction that the petitioner could be 
found guilty for displaying a red flag as “a sign, symbol, or emblem of 
opposition to organized government, or was an invitation or stimulus to 
anarchistic action, or was in aid to propaganda that is of a seditious 
character.”
28
  The Court held that the first clause of the instruction 
proscribed constitutionally protected conduct and concluded that 
Stromberg’s conviction must be reversed because “it [wa]s impossible to say 
under which clause of the [instruction] the conviction was obtained.”
29
  In 
other words, because one portion of the jury instruction was constitutionally 
suspect and the jury failed to specify which portion of the instruction was 
used to find the verdict, the court found the conviction could not be upheld.
30
 
                                                          
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id. at 103. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 104. 
 26.  283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
 27.  Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 52 (1991). 
 28.  283 U.S. at 363 (quoting the trial court’s instruction).  
 29.  Id. at 368. 
 30.  Id. 
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In Yates v. United States, the Supreme Court extended the reasoning 
used in Stromberg, holding that a jury cannot convict a defendant when 
relying on an instruction with a partial defect.
31
  The jury in Yates was faced 
with an instruction that included both a charge of conspiracy with intent to 
overthrow the government and a charge of conspiracy to advocate the 
violent overthrow of government.
32
  Because the former charge was barred 
by the statute of limitations, even though the latter charge was not, the Court 
reversed and remanded because the charge relied upon for conviction could 
not be determined.
33
  Hence, Yates extended Stromberg and opened the 
doors to reversals based not only on convictions resting on multiple theories 
of guilt with constitutionally suspect clauses, but also on theories that, while 
not unconstitutional, are otherwise legally flawed. 
B.  Early Alternative Means Jurisprudence in Kansas 
In State v. Wilson, the Kansas Supreme Court examined an alternative 
means issue for the first time in the context of a first-degree murder case 
with a confession and ample evidence to support both means of committing 
first degree murder: premeditated murder and felony murder.
34
  In the 
parlance of the current Kansas Supreme Court, there was super sufficiency 
of the evidence.  In essence, the defendant in Wilson asserted that the jury 
must be unanimous as to the means by which the crime was committed.
35
  
The defendant was concerned that some members of the jury could have 
found him guilty of premeditated murder while others may have found him 
guilty of felony murder, that is, “a killing in the perpetration or attempt to 
perpetrate a robbery.”
36
  Addressing the defendant’s specific concern of the 
prospect of a jury split on the underlying theory of guilt threatening 
unanimity in a case when both means are supported by sufficient evidence, 
the court stated that “the verdict cannot be impeached by showing that part 




                                                          
 31.  354 U.S. 298, 311–12 (1957), overruled on other grounds by Burks v. U.S., 437 U.S. 1, 18 
(1978). 
 32.  Id. at 301, 311–12. 
 33.  Id. at 311–13, 338.  
 34.  552 P.2d 931, 934–36, 938 (Kan. 1976).  
 35.  Id. at 935. 
 36.  Id. (quoting the trial court’s instructions). 
 37.  Id. at 936.  The court in Wright suggests Wilson, as opposed to Timley, might well be 
considered the source of the super sufficiency rule in Kansas because the “holding from Wilson 
necessarily depended on the existence of sufficient evidence on each alternate theory.”  State v. 
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Noticeably, the court did not recite the common law single-means-is-
good-enough rule in rejecting the defendant’s position, instead relying on the 
fact there was super sufficiency of the evidence.
38
  One could reasonably 
speculate this was an artful step taken to avoid resolving the perceived clash 
between Stromberg’s rule and the centuries-old common law rule.  The 
Kansas Supreme Court would have over a decade before the clash between 
these two rules was squarely before it. 
1.  The Kansas Supreme Court Misconstrues Stromberg and Departs 
from the Common Law 
Twelve years after Wilson, in State v. Garcia, the Kansas Supreme 
Court made a clear break from the old common law alternative means rule 
based upon its misinterpretation of Stromberg.
39
  Garcia had been charged 
with killing his victim while burglarizing either a house or a pickup truck, 
and the court concluded the evidence did not support the burglary of the 
pickup.
40
  Consequently, the court reversed Garcia’s conviction for felony 
murder.
41
  The Kansas Supreme Court held that, “[s]ince one of the two 
alternative burglary theories advanced by the State is not supported by 
sufficient evidence, the defendant’s conviction for burglary and his 
conviction for felony murder based upon that burglary must be reversed.”
42
  
In short, the court applied Stromberg’s rule, meant for the circumstance 
when one of the means was unconstitutional or legally flawed,
43
 to the 
circumstance of a factually inadequate theory. 
2. Kansas Returns to the Common Law Alternative Means Rule 
In State v. Grissom,
44
 the Kansas Supreme Court held it was “no longer 
bound by [its] earlier interpretation of Stromberg” in light of the United 
States Supreme Court’s holding in Griffin v. United States.
45
  In Griffin, the 
                                                          
Wright, 224 P.3d 1159, 1164 (Kan. 2010). 
 38.  Wilson, 552 P.2d at 935–36. 
 39.  State v. Garcia, 763 P.2d 585, 594 (Kan. 1988). 
 40.  Id. at 588–89, 594. 
 41.  Id. at 594.  
 42.  Id.  
 43.  See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 (1991) (stating that the Stromberg holding 
“do[es] not necessarily stand for anything more than the principle that, where a provision of the 
Constitution forbids conviction on a particular ground, the constitutional guarantee is violated by a 
general verdict that may have rested on that ground”). 
      44. 840 P.2d 1142 (Kan. 1992). 
 45.  502 U.S. 46 (1991). 
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Court considered “whether, in a federal prosecution, a general guilty verdict 
on a multiple-object conspiracy charge must be set aside if the evidence is 
inadequate to support conviction as to one of the objects.”
46
  Griffin was 
charged with “conspiring to defraud an agency of the Federal Government,” 
and the two alleged objects of the conspiracy were to impair the Internal 
Revenue Service’s efforts “to ascertain income taxes,” and to impair the 
Drug Enforcement Administration’s efforts “to ascertain forfeitable 
assets.”
47
  The trial court instructed the jury that it could return a guilty 
verdict if it found Griffin had “participated in either one of the two objects 
of the conspiracy.”
48
  On appeal, the Court affirmed the convictions, holding 
that the Due Process Clause does not require a general guilty verdict on a 
multiple-object conspiracy to be set aside when the evidence is insufficient 
to support a conviction on one of the conspiracy’s objects.
49
 
Noting that Griffin clarified that Stromberg only applied when one of 
the theories of guilt which could have been relied on by the jury was 
unconstitutional or illegal, the Kansas Supreme Court held that “if there is 
sufficient evidence to convict [Grissom] of either premeditated or felony 
murder, the general verdict should be upheld.”
50
  In returning to the 
centuries-old common law rule set forth in detail in Griffin, the Kansas 
Supreme Court cited liberally from Griffin, which set forth the rationale 
surrounding the long-standing rule in alternative means cases when one of 
the means is merely unsupported by the evidence: 
Jurors are not generally equipped to determine whether a particular 
theory of conviction submitted to them is contrary to law—whether, for 
example, the action in question is protected by the Constitution, is time 
barred, or fails to come within the statutory definition of the crime.  
When, therefore, jurors have been left the option of relying upon a 
legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think that their own 
intelligence and expertise will save them from that error.  Quite the 
opposite is true, however, when they have been left the option of 
relying upon a factually inadequate theory, since jurors are well 
equipped to analyze the evidence.
51
 
However, the Kansas Supreme Court’s re-adoption of the common law 
                                                          
 46.  Id. at 47. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id.  
 49.  Id. at 49–51, 60. 
 50.  State v. Grissom, 840 P.2d 1142, 1171 (Kan. 1992). 
 51.  Id. (quoting Griffin, 502 U.S. at 59). 
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alternative means rationale would be short-lived.
52
 
C. Abandoning the Common Law for Washington’s Alternative Means 
Rule 
In State v. Timley, the Kansas Supreme Court broke away from the 
centuries-old common law rule it embraced just three years earlier in 
Grissom.
53
  This time the court did so without the confusion caused by 
Stromberg.  The only authority cited for this major sea-change in Kansas law 
was a Washington case finding a distinction between alternative means and 
“multiple acts” jury instructions.
54
  The issue in Timley, as eventually framed 
by the court, was whether there was sufficient evidence to support a jury’s 
guilty verdict for rape under both of the state’s theories: rape accomplished 
by force, and rape accomplished by fear.
55
  After determining there was 
sufficient evidence under either theory, the Timley court ruled that, if two 
alternative means of committing a crime find their way into the jury 
instructions, then there must be sufficient evidence to support both means—
in other words, super sufficiency.
56
 
Timley notably failed to directly confront and overrule Grissom’s tacit 
rejection of the so-called super sufficiency requirement.  Indeed, Timley 
scarcely elucidated any rationale for its ruling,
57
 setting up two opposing 
rules of law in Kansas, each potentially controlling.  Grissom’s rule, 
                                                          
 52.  State v. Timley, 875 P.2d 242, 246 (Kan. 1994). The court abandoned the common law 
alternative means rationale, ruling that there must be sufficient evidence to support each alternative 
means of committing a crime when two alternative means are contained in the jury instructions.  Id.  
Unfortunately, the clearest statement of this rule, and the only statement that directly conflicts with 
Grissom, only appears in the syllabus of the case.  Id. at syl. ¶ 1. 
 53.  Id. at 246. 
 54.  Id. (citing State v. Kitchen, 756 P.2d 105, 109 (Wash. 1988)). 
 55.  Timley, 875 P.2d at 246. 
 56.  Id.  Again, it should be noted here that, more recently in State v. Brooks, the Kansas Court 
of Appeals held that “‘force or fear’ is a single, unified means of committing rape,” calling Timley’s 
conclusion otherwise “unstudied dicta.” State v. Brooks, 265 P.3d 1175, 1184 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011), 
rev. granted No. 102,452 (Kan. June 13, 2012).  In Wright v. State, a case that is the prisoner-in-
custody review from the defendant in State v. Wright, a different panel of the Kansas Court of 
Appeals reached the same conclusion as Brooks.  State v. Wright, 224 P.3d 1159 (Kan. 2010); 
Wright v. State, 294 P.3d 1201, 1209–10 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013) (using the definition of “alternative 
means” as set forth in State v. Brown, 284 P.3d 977, 983 (Kan. 2012)).  In other words, the very 
factual circumstance that ushered in super sufficiency in Kansas is no longer governed by the rule, 
assuming the court of appeals has applied Brown’s definition of alternative means correctly. 
 57.  Timley, 875 P.2d. at 245–46.  See also State v. Shaw, 281 P.3d 576, 586 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2012) (Malone, J., concurring) (“Timley actually contains very little analysis of the alternative means 
issue.  In fact, the opinion only refers to the issue in order to explain the difference between an 
alternative means case and a multiple acts case.”). 
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generally speaking, works to affirm guilty verdicts when the evidence 
supports one statutory means of guilt, but not another.
58
  Timley’s super 
sufficiency rule, found in the syllabus but not the text of the opinion, 
requires sufficient evidence supporting each and every means.
59
  While most 
Kansas courts followed Timley,
60
 all of the cases following Timley’s 
analytical pattern had super sufficiency of the evidence, save one, State v. 
Crane, which is plausible to read as ultimately holding that none of the 
means of kidnapping were sufficiently proven.
61
  When super sufficiency 
exists, the distinction between the Grissom/Griffin rule and the Timley rule is 
irrelevant to the outcome, and the court is not pressed to pick between the 
two rules, or expound upon or distinguish one or both rules.  In the era of 
Grissom’s and Timley’s coexistence, three cases in the Kansas Court of 
Appeals in which there was not super sufficiency highlight the different 
approaches that were possible while applying the court’s contradictory 
                                                          
 58.  State v. Grissom, 840 P.2d 1142, 1171 (Kan. 1992).  However, the court did state that “if 
the evidence is insufficient to support an alternative legal theory of liability, it would generally be 
preferable for the court to give an instruction removing that theory from the jury’s consideration. 
The refusal to do so, however, does not provide an independent basis for reversing an otherwise 
valid conviction.”  Id. (quoting Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 60 (1991)).  
 59.  Timley, 875 P.2d at syl. ¶ 1.  “[A]lthough the text of the Timley opinion did not say so 
explicitly, the language and logic of the opinion and the court syllabus set up a condition for 
application of the alternative means rule to future cases: To avoid reversal, the evidence of each 
means had to be sufficient to support the conviction.”  Beier, supra note 9, at 283 (quoting Timley, 
875 P.2d at 246).   
 60.  See, e.g., State v. Morton, 86 P.3d 535, 539–40 (Kan. 2004); State v. Hoge, 80 P.3d 52, 62 
(Kan. 2003); State v. Beach, 67 P.3d 121, 135 (Kan. 2003); State v. Davis, 998 P.2d 1127, 1139–40 
(Kan. 2000); State v. Carr, 963 P.2d 421, 429–30 (Kan. 1998); State v. Kelly, 942 P.2d 579, 583 
(Kan. 1997); State v. Crane, 918 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Kan. 1996); State v. Alford, 896 P.2d 1059, 1068 
(Kan. 1995). 
 61.  918 P.2d 1256, 1271–74. (Kan. 1996).  In Crane, the defendant’s contention was that 
“there was insufficient evidence to support the charge of kidnapping to facilitate the commission of 
crime under 21-3420(b).”  Id. at 1271.  The state had also alleged kidnapping with the intent “to 
inflict bodily injury or to terrorize the victim” under subsection (c) of K.S.A. 21-3420.  Id.  It is clear 
the court found there was insufficient evidence to support kidnapping under subsection (b).  Id. at 
1271–73.  What is curious is that the court simply reversed the kidnapping conviction and did not 
state whether or not retrial was appropriate with regard to subsection (c).  Id. at 1274.  The author of 
the Wright opinion, Justice Carol Beier, addressed the alternative means retrial issue in a law review 
article as follows: “In a Timley alternative means case, any reversal would be grounded on a failure 
of proof, a violation of the super-sufficiency condition.  Thus retrial on that theory could not be 
permitted.  It, like retrial on any theory held unsupported by sufficient evidence on appeal, would 
result in double jeopardy.  The defendant can only be retried on the theory for which evidence was 
sufficient the first time, without the pollution of evidence or argument supporting the alternative 
theory.” 
Beier, supra note 9, at 294 (citations omitted).  Perhaps the fact that the court did not take up the 
issue of retrial under subsection (c) at all, combined with its statement that the “evidence which 
might support the kidnapping conviction is very thin,” means the court regarded both means of 
proving kidnapping insufficiently proved.  Crane, 918 P.2d at 1273.  Or perhaps this is just an 
anomaly.   
  




D.  The Era of Grissom’s and Timley’s Contradictory Precedents in the 
Kansas Court of Appeals 
In State v. Ice, the Kansas Court of Appeals applied the Grissom/Griffin 
rule in overturning the defendant’s conviction because the court “[had] no 
idea whether the jury found Ice guilty of rape due to force and fear being 
used, or due to a lack of capacity of the victim to consent, or a combination 
of the two.”
63
  The court distinguished Griffin, pointing out that Griffin 
involved a situation in which there was strong evidence of one theory and no 
evidence on another.
64
  In that context, the court noted, the presumption that 
jurors will not “behave capriciously” is a reasonable one.
65
  In the case of 
Ice, however, much testimony and prosecutorial effort were invested in the 
“no capacity theory,” for which there was insufficient evidence.
66
  The court 
ultimately overturned the conviction because “there [was] no real possibility 
that the verdict here was based only on the force and fear theory.” 
67
 
On the one hand, one could argue Ice’s holding is squarely 
contemplated by the holding of Griffin.  The common law presumption that 
the jury convicted on the good theory could reasonably be contradicted by 
the record in Ice—and there is a scant portion in the Griffin opinion which 
seems to make provision for this circumstance.
68
  However, another portion 
of Griffin more forcefully rejects this approach as one setting up two 
categories of failure: “sufficiently insufficient,” and “insufficiently 
insufficient,” rewarding the “greater failure of proof.”
69
 
In simpler terms, Ice did not follow the common law rule as set forth in 
Griffin.  But why?  Two reasons: compelling facts for the defendant, and 
application of a Kansas statute.  Ice’s chosen language that “there [was] no 
real possibility that the verdict here was based only on the force or fear 
                                                          
 62.  State v. Ice, 997 P.2d 737 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Money, No. 83,209, 2000 Kan. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 457 (Kan. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2000); State v. Johnson, 11 P.3d 67 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2000). 
 63.  Ice, 997 P.2d at 741. 
 64.  Id.   
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id.   
 68.  See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 49–50 (1991) (noting that the presumption will 
stand “in the absence of anything in the record to show the contrary” (quoting Claassen v. United 
States, 142 U.S. 140, 146 (1891))). 
 69.  Id. at 58.  See also State v. Jones, 29 P.3d 351, 370–71 (Haw. 2001) (describing Ice’s 
holding as adopting a rule that was rejected by Griffin’s application of the common law rule). 
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theory”
70
 indicates the court was applying K.S.A. 22-3414(3)
71
 because 
there was no objection to the instruction.
72
  In other words, the Ice court 
applied a statute that has long been held to apply to the circumstance of 
clearly erroneous unchallenged instructions. 
In the other two alternative means cases in 2000 without super 
sufficiency, the Kansas Court of Appeals paid lip service to the 
Grissom/Griffin rule but used it to justify application of a harmless error 
analysis.
73
  In State v. Johnson and State v. Money, the court cited 
approvingly the Grissom/Griffin rule, except that the courts substituted 
harmless error rationale for the Grissom/Griffin regime,
74
 which starts from 
the presumption the jury convicted the defendant on the sufficient theory—a 
presumption which favors the state and requires evidence in the record 
indicating the jury did not convict based on the sufficient theory.
75
  These 
cases were as much a foreshadowing of the Kansas Supreme Court’s holding 
in State v. Dixon as they were cases choosing to follow Grissom’s common 
law presumptions over Timley.
76
 
                                                          
 70.  Ice, 997 P.2d at 741. 
 71.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3414(3) (2012) (“No party may assign as error the giving or failure 
to give an instruction, including a lesser included crime instruction, unless the party objects thereto 
before the jury retires to consider its verdict stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects 
and the grounds of the objection unless the instruction or failure to give an instruction is clearly 
erroneous.”). 
 72.  See State v. Cook, 191 P.3d 294, 303 (Kan. 2008) (stating that under the clearly erroneous 
standard, before an appellate court can overturn a conviction it must be firmly convinced that “a real 
possibility exists that the jury would have rendered a different verdict if the instruction error had not 
occurred”). 
 73.  See State v. Money, No. 83,209, 2000 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 457 (Kan. Ct. App. Nov. 
3, 2000); State v. Johnson, 11 P.3d 67 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000). 
 74. Money, No. 83,209, 2000 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 457, at *7–8; Johnson, 11 P.3d at 69–
70.  
 75.  See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 49–50 (1991) (noting that the presumption the 
jury convicted on the theory supported by the evidence will stand “in the absence of anything in the 
record to show the contrary” (quoting Claassen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140, 146 (1891))). 
 76.  These cases chose to apply harmless error analysis which is not in Grissom/Griffin’s DNA.  
Neither Griffin nor Grissom applied harmless error analysis—their rule eschews the application of 
harmless error analysis.  Basically, the cases harvested Grissom/Griffin’s rationale at the heart of the 
common law presumption: applying harmless error analysis as opposed to following Timley’s strict 
super sufficiency rule, which would automatically overturn the conviction.  
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E.  The Clash of Concepts Reaches the Kansas Supreme Court: Timley’s 
Super Sufficiency Rule v. Harmless Error Statutes 
1.  Dixon’s Shift to the Harmless Error Analysis 
In State v. Dixon,
77
 the Grissom rule emerged again at the Kansas 
Supreme Court for a cameo of sorts.  In essence, the court in Dixon co-opted 
the presumption at the heart of the old common law—that jurors are well 
equipped to analyze the evidence when they have been left the option of 
relying upon a factually inadequate theory.
78
  Dixon did not stand for the 
proposition that the law return to a pure version of the centuries-old rule, but 
rather adopted the proposition that harmless error could be applied when the 
jury instructions contained insufficiently proved means.
79
  The Dixon court 
ultimately found that, because there was strong evidence supporting at least 
one theory of the burglaries and no evidence of the unsupported theory, the 
verdict would stand, classifying the error in instruction as harmless.
80
  
Dixon, in essence, analyzed the facts for super sufficiency, and, after 
determining there was not super sufficiency, applied the harmless error 
analysis.
81
  Of course, the trend of citing Timley’s rule when there was super 
sufficiency continued after Dixon.
82
 
Dixon, Johnson, and Money applied the harmless error rule because 
federal and state harmless error review had been the standard in American 
jurisprudence since the early 1900s.  It was a reaction to the then 
“widespread and deep conviction over the general course of appellate review 
in American criminal causes.”
83
  Prior to harmless error reform, courts of 
review were said to “tower above the trials of criminal cases as impregnable 
citadels of technicality.”
84
  With the threat of reversal so great, the criminal 
                                                          
 77.  112 P.3d 883 (Kan. 2005). 
 78.  Id. at 912–13. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 913. 
 81.  Id.  See also State v. Shaw, 281 P.3d 576, 586 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (Malone, J., 
concurring) (“Timley stated the rule of law to determine whether an alternative means error has been 
committed, but the opinion never stated that the error could not be harmless.  The [Kansas] Supreme 
Court later explained in Dixon that an alternative means error can be harmless.”).   
 82.  See, e.g., State v. Stevens, 172 P.3d 570, 578–81 (Kan. 2007), abrogated by State v. 
Ahrens, 290 P.3d 629 (Kan. 2012) (citing State v. Timley, 875 P.2d 242, 246 (1994)) (ruling that 
sufficient evidence existed to support both means of committing the single crime of operating or 
attempting to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol).   
 83.  Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946). 
 84.  Id. at 759 (quoting Marcus A. Kavanagh, Improvement of Administration of Criminal 
Justice by Exercise of Judicial Power, 11 A.B.A. J. 217, 222 (1925)).  
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trial “became a game for sowing reversible error in the record, only to have 
repeated the same matching of wits when a new trial had been thus 
obtained.”
85
  As the United States Supreme Court in Kotteakos explained, 
the object of developing the doctrine of harmless error was to “substitute 
judgment for automatic application of rules . . . to preserve review as a check 
. . . [on] essential unfairness in trials . . . without giving men fairly convicted 
the multiplicity of loopholes” to escape conviction.
86
 
2.  Cook’s Application of the Clear Error Statute for Un-objected to 
Instructions 
The trend of applying harmless error analysis when super sufficiency 
was not present was tweaked in State v. Cook, when the Kansas Supreme 
Court applied K.S.A. 22-3414(3) to the district court’s unchallenged 
instruction, which included a factually unsupported theory of guilt.
87
  By 
applying this statute, the Cook court took a similar analytical tact as the 
Kansas Court of Appeals in Ice.  In relevant part, K.S.A. 22-3414(3) states: 
No party may assign as error the giving . . . [of] an instruction . . . 
unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its 
verdict stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the 




In Cook, an occupant of a residence invited the defendant inside.
89
  The 
defendant felt one of the other occupants owed him money, so the defendant 
proceeded directly to the other occupant’s bedroom door and knocked.
90
  
The other occupant told the defendant to leave, ultimately emerging from the 
bedroom while yelling for the defendant to leave the house.
91
  The defendant 
shot and killed the victim.
92
 
The trial court’s instruction for aggravated burglary included the 
                                                          
 85.  Id. at 759.  See also Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 422 (1980) (noting that attorneys, knowing that any error, no matter 
how inconsequential, would result in a new trial “placed error in the record as a hedge against losing 
the verdict”). 
 86.  Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 760. 
 87.  191 P.3d 294, 301, 303 (Kan. 2008). 
 88.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3414(3) (2012). 
 89.  191 P.3d at 299. 
 90.  Id. at 298–99. 
 91.  Id. at 299. 
 92.  Id. 
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elements: “1. That the defendant knowingly entered into or remained in a 
home; 2. That the defendant did so without authority.”
93
  The Cook court 
held that “entering into” without authority, and “remaining within” without 
authority constituted alternative means of committing aggravated burglary.
94
 
The court in Cook noted that there was no evidence supporting the 
“entering into without authority” theory, and the record indicated the State 
“relied exclusively on the ‘remained in’ means,” as the “prosecutor’s 
arguments to the jury clearly established that the State’s theory was that 
Cook’s presence in the [victim’s] residence became unauthorized when the 
victim told him to go away.”
95
  There being no objection to the instruction 
from the defendant, the court applied the clearly erroneous standard for 
instructional errors per K.S.A. 22-3414(3).
96
  Under that standard, before an 
appellate court can overturn a conviction, it “must be firmly convinced that 
there was a real possibility that the jury would have rendered a different 
verdict” if the instructional error had not occurred.
97
  After a review of the 
record, the court found that had “entering into” been excluded from the 
instructions, as should have happened, the verdict would have been the 
same, so there was no clear error.
98
 
While the Cook court cited Dixon, it chose not to apply the harmless 
error statute, citing K.S.A. 22-3414(3).
99
  Instead, Cook seemed to comply 
with the canon of statutory construction that statutes which relate “to a 
specific thing, take precedence over general statutes.”
100
  In other words, 
K.S.A. 22-3414(3), at least as construed by Kansas courts, was the more 
specific statute to address a situation involving an unchallenged jury 
instruction than the more general harmless error statute.
101
 
                                                          
 93.  Id. at 303. 
 94.  Id. (citing State v. Smith, 142 P.3d 739, 746 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006)). 
 95.  Id. at 303. 
 96.  Id. at 301. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 303. 
 99.  Id. at 301.  
 100.  Chelsea Plaza Homes, Inc. v. Moore, 601 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Kan. 1979) (holding that when 
“there is a conflict between a statute dealing generally with a subject, and another dealing 
specifically with a certain phase of it, the specific legislation controls”).  See also State v. Turner, 
272 P.3d 19, 22 (Kan. 2012) (citing State v. Chavez, 254 P.3d 539, 542 (Kan. 2011)) (“When 
statutes overlap and produce inconsistent results, we may turn to the canon of construction providing 
that a specific statute controls over a more general statute.”). 
 101.  See State v. Williams, 286 P.3d 195, 200–02 (Kan. 2012) (acknowledging that there is no 
textual support for equating “clearly erroneous” with “clearly prejudicial,” but refusing to alter the 
judicially created additions to the statute because the statute has been construed that way for 
decades). 
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F.  The Smorgasbord Of Contradictory Precedents Available in 2008: A 
Summary 
After Cook, a buffet of precedent lay before appellate courts wrestling 
with alternative means instruction errors.  Cook’s application of K.S.A. 22-
3414(3) was only available for cases when a defendant did not object to the 
faulty instruction.  There was the Grissom/Griffin rule which worked to 
affirm convictions where any means was supported by the evidence.  There 
was Timley’s rule requiring super sufficiency.  Finally, there was Dixon’s 
rule, which applied harmless error analysis if super sufficiency was lacking. 
1.  The United States Supreme Court Holds Harmless Error Analysis Can 
Be Applied to All Alternative Means Error 
In 2008 in Hedgpeth v. Pulido,
102
 the United States Supreme Court 
revisited its holdings in Stromberg and Yates and held that alternative means 
error, even when a jury is given the option of convicting on a legally flawed 
or unconstitutional theory, can be analyzed for harmlessness.  In 
distinguishing Stromberg and Yates, the Hedgpeth Court noted that both of 
these cases were decided before it had concluded in Chapman v. 
California
103
 that constitutional errors can be harmless.
104
 
The Court then cited a series of cases where the Court had previously 
found instructional error to be subject to harmless-error review.
105
  The 
Court pointed out that it had, years earlier, emphasized that “while there are 
some errors to which [harmless-error analysis] does not apply, they are the 
exception and not the rule.”
106
  The exception, called “structural error,” 
would occur if the instructional error categorically vitiated all of the jury’s 
findings, as would happen if the Court failed to give a reasonable doubt 
instruction in a criminal case.
107
  Ultimately, the Hedgpeth Court held that 
“[a]n instructional error arising in the context of multiple theories of guilt no 
more vitiates all the jury’s findings than does omission or misstatement of 
                                                          
    102.    555 U.S. 57 (2008). 
 103.  386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
 104.  Hedgpeth, 555 U.S. at 60. 
 105.  Id. at 60–61 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (omission of an element of 
an offense); California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2 (1996) (per curiam) (erroneous aider and abettor 
instruction); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987) (misstatement of an element of an offense); Rose 
v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) (erroneous burden-shifting as to an element of an offense). 
 106.  Hedgpeth, 555 U.S. at 61 (quoting Rose, 478 U.S. at 578).   
 107.  See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1993). 
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an element of the offense when only one theory is submitted.”
108
 
The Court went further, calling the distinction between “alternative-
theory” errors and those instructional errors omitting or misstating an entire 
element “patently illogical.”
109
  The Court found that such a distinction 
results in alternative theory instruction errors being treated as more harmful 
than when an entire element is omitted from the instructions.
110
  The Kansas 
Supreme Court makes this distinction, holding in Wright that alternative 
means errors cannot be subject to harmless error analysis,
111
 while holding 
in State v. Reyna that harmless error analysis will be applied when the 
instructions fail to inform the jury of the element’s existence.
112
 
III.  THE ADVENT OF STATE V. WRIGHT 
Two years after Hedgpeth, the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Wright 
once again found itself choosing from a buffet of contradictory precedents in 
an alternative means case. 
In Wright, the defendant was in the business of providing massages out 
of her home.
113
  The victim went to the defendant’s house for a massage, got 
out of her clothes, and covered herself with a beach towel.
114
  The massage 
began, and eventually the victim fell asleep.
115
  The victim awoke only to 
find the defendant’s fingers moving in and out of her vagina.
116
  The victim 
was startled at first, then became scared.
117
  The victim wanted to get up and 
hit the defendant, but was too afraid.
118
  The victim became tense, and the 
defendant quit.
119
  The defendant asserted that she only accidentally 




The trial court instructed the jury on two means of committing rape: 1) 
                                                          
 108.  Hedgpeth, 555 U.S. at 61.  
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  State v. Wright, 224 P.3d 1159, 1166–67 (Kan. 2010). 
 112.  234 P.3d 761, 771–73 (Kan. 2010) These two holdings could just as easily be held up to 
show how patently illogical it is to allow appellate court fact finding to replace jury fact finding in 
cases where elements are wholly omitted from the instructions.  
 113.  224 P.3d at 1160.  
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id.  
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 1161. 
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under circumstances when she was overcome by force or fear; or 2) under 
circumstances when she was unconscious or physically powerless.
121
  The 
defendant effectively conceded there was enough evidence to support the 
conviction under the “unconscious” theory, but contended that the State’s 
proof of rape by force or fear was insufficient.
122
  The defendant’s 
contention was that initial penetration and fear must occur simultaneously to 
satisfy the “by force or fear” means.
123
  According to the defendant’s 
contentions, since one of the instructed upon means was not proved, State v. 
Timley’s super sufficiency rule required a reversal of her conviction.
124
  The 
State’s position was that Dixon’s application of the harmless error rule 




Ultimately, the Wright court disagreed with the defendant’s contention 
that fear and initial penetration must be simultaneous, stating “it is enough 
that the penetration and fear were eventually contemporaneous.”
126
  In short, 
the court held the defendant’s convictions were affirmed because there was 
sufficient evidence supporting both means.  In what must have seemed like a 
hollow victory for the defendant in Wright, the court considered its 
contradictory precedents and clarified that Timley’s rule requiring super 




A.  Attempts to Justify Timley 
1. The Roadblocks 
Wright articulated a justification for the Timley rule that did not appear 
in Timley itself.  However, before exploring Wright’s chosen justification, it 
is instructive to understand what viable options were really out there to 
justify Timley’s rule.  If you understand where Wright could not feasibly go 
to justify Timley, you might better understand why Wright went where it did.  
Some legal avenues one might at first consider in justifying Timley had 
effectively been shut down. 
                                                          
 121.  Id. at 1163. 
 122.  Id. at 1164. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. at 1167. 
 127.  Id. 
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For instance, Griffin held that the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment 
Due Process Clause did not, and never has, required super sufficiency of the 
evidence.
128
  Griffin eliminated an obvious avenue for those inclined to 
believe fundamental due process required super sufficiency of the evidence 
in alternative means cases.
129
  The United States Supreme Court always has 
the final say on the U.S. Constitution, but we are in a federal system; the 
states can follow their own paths to a substantial degree.  So, what keeps the 
Kansas Supreme Court from saying the Kansas constitution requires super-
sufficiency consistent with Timley’s rule? 
While the Kansas Supreme Court has “the right to interpret [the] Kansas 
constitution in a manner different than the United States Constitution has 
been construed,” it has “not traditionally done so.”
130
  Generally, the Kansas 
Supreme Court has only interpreted provisions of the Kansas constitution 
differently than similar provisions of the U.S. Constitution when the United 
States Supreme Court had receded from a protected position.
131
  The U.S. 
Constitution’s Due Process Clause has never been interpreted to require 
super sufficiency in verdicts as a hedge against the possibility of conviction 
based on a factually inadequate theory.
132
 
Furthermore, because, in the criminal law context, there is no Kansas 
State constitutional counterpart to the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment 
Due Process Clause,
133
 any finding that the Kansas constitution’s due 
process protections are more expansive than the U.S. Constitution’s due 
process protections would necessarily involve comparing an imagined due 
process clause to an enumerated Due Process Clause in existence.
134
 
Another problem one would encounter in justifying Timley’s evolution 
is Kansas’s historical reliance on the common law in construing the Kansas 
constitution.  The common law reliance would presumably lead the Kansas 
                                                          
 128.  502 U.S. 46, 48–60 (1991). 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  State v. Crow, 974 P.2d 100, 107 (Kan. 1999) (citing Murphy v. Nelson, 921 P.2d 1225 
(Kan. 1996)); State v. Schultz, 850 P.2d 818 (Kan. 1993) overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Laturner, 218 P.3d 23 (Kan. 2009). 
 131.  See State v. Lawson, 297 P.3d 1164, 1170 (Kan. 2013) (“In other words, having followed 
the United States Supreme Court into the clearing, [in State v. McDaniel, 612 P.2d 1231 (Kan. 
1980)] the Kansas Supreme Court refused to follow the higher Court’s dive back into the forest.”). 
 132.  See Griffin, 502 U.S. at 49–52, 60. 
 133.  Section 10 of the Kansas Constitution lists a mixture of clauses concerning due process 
from both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, but does not specifically contain 
a due process clause per se.  KAN. CONST. § 10.  
 134.  The language, “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law” from the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, does not appear in the Kansas 
Constitution.  U.S. CONST. amend. V; KAN. CONST.   
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Supreme Court to the same conclusion reached by the United States 
Supreme Court in Griffin: that due process does not require super sufficiency 
because the historical practice in England well before the Declaration of 
Independence never required it.
135
  Consider the following passage regarding 
section 10 of the Kansas bill of rights from State v. Criqui: 
It is elementary that the Constitution is to be interpreted in the light of 
the common law. 
It is also a very reasonable rule that a state Constitution shall be 
understood and construed in the light and by the assistance of the 
common law, and with the fact in view that its rules are still left in 
force.  By this we do not mean that the common law is to control the 
Constitution, or that the latter is to be warped and perverted in its 
meaning in order that no inroads, or as few as possible, may be made in 
the system of common-law rules, but only that for its definitions we are 
to draw from that great fountain, and that in judging what it means, we 
are to keep in mind that it is not the beginning of law for the state, but 
that it assumes the existence of a well-understood system which is still 
to remain in force and be administered, but under such limitations and 
restrictions as that instrument imposes. 
Section 10 of the Bill of Rights is virtually a transcript from 
authenticated English guaranties of personal liberty and security, and 
cannot be understood without understanding the common law.
136
 
A similar statement has been made of the federal Due Process Clause: “[i]t is 
precisely the historical practices that define what is ‘due.’”
137
 
Finally, justifying Timley is problematic because the Kansas Supreme 
Court “has consistently held that Section 5 [of the Kansas constitution’s bill 
of rights] preserves the jury trial right as it historically existed at common 
law when [the] state’s constitution came into existence.”
138
  When 
interpreting the Kansas constitution, Kansas courts have traditionally 
employed a fixed-meaning canon, described by the United States Supreme 
Court as requiring that “[w]ords must be read with the gloss of the 
experience of those who framed them . . . .”
139
  So, where did the court in 
Wright turn in articulating a justification for Timley’s unexplained 
                                                          
 135.  Griffin, 502 U.S. at 49–52. 
 136.  185 P. 1063, 1065 (Kan. 1919) (citations omitted).  
 137.  Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 650 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 138.  Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098, 1108 (Kan. 2012) (citing State ex rel. Curtis, Co. v. City 
of Topeka, 12 P. 310, 316 (Kan. 1886)). 
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abandonment of the Grissom precedent? 
2.  The Verdict Procedure Statute 
The Wright court held the requirement of super sufficiency in alternative 
means cases represented the “only choice to ensure a criminal defendant’s 
statutory entitlement to jury unanimity.”
140
  Because, at common law, there 
was no entitlement to super sufficiency, “ensur[ing] a criminal defendant’s 
statutory entitlement to jury unanimity” must mean that the common law in 
alternative means cases was modified by a statute which requires super 
sufficiency.
141
  The statute the Wright court was referring to is K.S.A. 22-
3421,
142
 which states: 
The verdict shall be written, signed by the presiding juror and read by 
the clerk to the jury, and the inquiry made whether it is the jury’s 
verdict.  If any juror disagrees, the jury must be sent out again; but if no 
disagreement is expressed, and neither party requires the jury to be 
polled, the verdict is complete and the jury discharged from the case.  If 
the verdict is defective in form only, it may be corrected by the court, 
with the assent of the jury, before it is discharged.
143
 
Typically, statutes in Kansas have not been interpreted as changing the 
common law unless explicitly provided.
144
  The assertion that the change 
must be explicit seems too strong, given the language of K.S.A. 77-109—the 
common law adopting statute. 
Nevertheless, the alteration of the prior law ought to be clear.
145
  K.S.A. 
                                                          
 140.  State v. Wright, 224 P.3d 1159, 1167 (Kan. 2010) (emphasis added).  
 141.  Id.  
 142.  Id. at 1164.  
 143.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3421 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 144.   See Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Carter, 184 P.3d 273, 277 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (citing In 
re Estate of Mettee, 694 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985), aff’d, 702 P.2d 1381 (Kan. 1985); In 
re Estate of Roloff, 143 P.3d 406, 410 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006)) (“[W]hen the legislature has intended 
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 145.   See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-109 (2012) (“The common law as modified by constitutional 
and statutory law, judicial decisions, and the conditions and wants of the people, shall remain in 
force in aid of the General Statutes of this state; but the rule of the common law, that statutes in 
derogation thereof shall be strictly construed, shall not be applicable to any general statute of this 
state, but all such statutes shall be liberally construed to promote their object.”); see also ANTONIN 
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 318 (2012) 
(“It has often been said that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed.  
That is a relic of the courts’ historical hostility to the emergence of statutory law.  The better view is 
that statutes will not be interpreted as changing the common law unless they effect the change with 
clarity.  There is no more reason to reject a fair reading that changes the common law than there is to 
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22-3421 incorporates within its text an additional common law rule that 
existed in harmony with the common law right to juror unanimity in verdicts 
and the centuries-old common law rule followed in Grissom.
146
  K.S.A. 22-
3421 codifies “the common-law rule that a verdict is of no force or validity 
until it is affirmed by the jury in open court.”
147
  Unanimity is required 
regardless of whether or not the trial court follows the verdict procedures set 
forth in K.S.A. 22-3421, and it does not necessarily follow that failing to 




The use of the word “any” in K.S.A. 22-3421 is a clear signal from the 
Kansas legislature that unanimity in Kansas criminal verdicts is still 
required.  Those in favor of a return to the Grissom precedent, however, 
might fairly argue that there are no textual clues to indicate that the 
legislature meant unanimity to mean anything other than it meant at common 
law. 
Those in favor of a return to the Grissom precedent would argue that the 
use of the word “any” in K.S.A. 22-3421 cannot be fairly read to tote with it 
a sea change in the law requiring super sufficiency in verdicts.  The Kansas 
Supreme Court recently echoed this staple of statutory construction by 
saying that “[a]n appellate court merely interprets the language as it appears; 
it is not free to speculate and cannot read into the statute language not 
readily found there.”
149
  Having plunked Timley’s super sufficiency rule atop 
this wobbly perch, where would the court turn in an attempt to stabilize its 
                                                          
reject a fair reading that repeals a prior statute . . . .  For both, the alteration of prior law must be 
clear—but it need not be express, nor should its clear implication be distorted.” (citations omitted)).  
Clearly Timley, on its face, modifies the common law rule through judicial decision, albeit without 
overruling Grissom, but the issue here is the verdict procedure statute’s role in justifying Timley’s 
departure from the centuries-old common law rule followed in Grissom. 
 146.  § 22-3421. 
 147.  State v. Johnson, 198 P.3d 769, 781 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Rigg v. Bias, 24 P. 56 
(Kan. 1890); Young v. Seymour, 4 Neb. 86 (1875)).   
 148.  See State v. Cheffen, 303 P.3d 1261, 1267 (Kan. 2013) (holding that “a party wishing to 
challenge the trial court’s compliance with the procedures set out in K.S.A. 22-3421 for inquiring 
about a jury’s verdict [must] have raised that issue first with the district court either in the form of a 
contemporaneous objection or posttrial [sic] motion”); State v. Womelsdorf, 274 P.3d 662, 674 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (“Under the facts of this case, any error by the district court in not following 
the procedure set forth in K.S.A. 22-3420(3) was harmless.”); State v. Dunlap, 266 P.3d 1242, 1250 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the issue of the district court’s failure to comply with the verdict 
procedure statute is waived if the defendant declines the district court’s offer to poll the jury). 
 149.  State v. Hopkins, 285 P.3d 1021, 1023 (Kan. 2012) (quoting Zimmerman v. Bd. of 
Wabaunsee Cnty. Comm’rs, 218 P.3d 400, 403 (Kan. 2009)).  See also Felix Frankfurter, Some 
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 533 (1947) (“Whatever temptations 
the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation 
and evisceration.  [The judge] must not read in by way of creation.”). 
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holding that the verdict procedure statute required super sufficiency? 
3. The Due Process Justification Emerges in a Supporting Role 
Wright further holds that applying harmless error to sufficiency of the 
evidence errors would violate the “most basic guarantee of due process in 
criminal cases.”
150
  Wright reached this conclusion by re-categorizing 
instances when one of the means upon which an instruction was given was 
not supported by the evidence; this was now a sufficiency of the evidence 
issue as opposed to an instructional error.
151
  The court in Wright evokes due 
process in overturning Dixon’s application of harmless error in alternative 
means cases, but cites no particular federal or state constitutional provision 
in doing so.
152
  Perhaps the court means to imply the verdict procedure 
statute also contains within its spirit a due process clause to go with its super 
sufficiency requirement.  However this turn of phrase is meant to be taken, it 
is clear the Kansas Supreme Court’s concern with alternative means cases 
does not begin and end with the requirement for unanimity in verdicts. 
a.  Non-unanimous Verdicts and Alternate Means 
If the Kansas legislature made a clear break from the common law, 
repealed the criminal verdict procedure statute, and passed a statute 
requiring the agreement of only ten out of twelve jurors for a criminal 
verdict in Kansas, what would become of the super sufficiency rule in 
Kansas?
153
  The super sufficiency rule might be in jeopardy because the 
Wright court uses the criminal procedure statute as an integral part of its 
justification for choosing the Timley rule over the Grissom/Griffin rule.
154
  
But the theoretical threat that a jury, by a verdict of ten out of twelve, might 
convict a defendant of a crime via a means not supported by the evidence 
                                                          
 150.  State v. Wright, 224 P.3d 1159, 1166 (Kan. 2010) (quoting Beier, supra note 9, at 299). 
 151.  Id. at 1163–67. 
 152.  Id. at 1166–67.   
 153.  See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972) (holding that state statute allowing non-
unanimous state verdicts in criminal cases does not violate Sixth Amendment, and both ten-to-one 
and eleven-to-one votes are permissible); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362–63 (1972) 
(holding that state statute allowing non-unanimous state verdict does not violate the Due Process or 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and a nine-to-three 
vote is permissible).  
 154.  The court in Wright does not distinguish between the holdings of Dixon and Grissom, 
portraying Dixon as representative of the rule of law in conflict with Timley’s rule of law.  As 
indicated above, Wright does not explicitly overrule Grissom as pointed out by Justice Moritz’s 
concurring opinion in State v. Brown.  284 P.3d 977, 1002 (Kan. 2012) (Moritz, J., concurring).  
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remains just the same as when unanimity is required.  The point is that, at its 
core, the problem Wright wants to solve is more a due process issue than a 
juror unanimity issue because the issue persists unaltered, even if unanimity 
were not required by our law.  But remember, as a primary justification for 
the super sufficiency rule, due process is problematic.  Relegating the due 
process justification to a supporting role tends to obscure the fatal flaws 
associated with utilizing due process as the primary justification for the 
super sufficiency rule. 
4.  The “Guilt v. Innocence” Justification 
Wright’s broadest justification for choosing the super sufficiency rule, 
sans harmless error analysis, is a generalized appeal to justice itself.  The 
Wright court asserts that its rule guarantees unanimity in verdicts “at the 
level of factual generality that matters most of all: guilt v. innocence.”
155
  
What the court means by this turn of phrase may be crucial to appellate 
counsel.  If the court means guilt v. innocence in fact, then the rule is meant 
to hold a special utility in separating actual guilty people from actual 
innocent people.  If the court means guilt v. innocence in law, then the 
statement can be taken as a restatement of the due process justification—the 
defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty legitimately by evidence 
sufficient to convict the defendant of each means submitted to the jury. 
So, what level of factual generality matters most of all when 
determining if a particular defendant in an alternative means case is guilty or 
innocent?  Wright answers that it is when all the alternative means of 
committing the crime that the jury was given the option to consider were 
proven by the state.
156
 
B.  Finding a Definition of Alternative Means 
Wright did not provide a nuanced definition for alternative means 
crimes, and, by requiring super sufficiency in verdicts immune from 
harmless error analysis, the judiciary would soon be much in want of one.  
Defendants convicted of crimes have scoured the penal code, definitional 
sections, and the principles of criminal liability, scrutinizing each “comma” 
and every “or” in search of an instructed upon means that may have gone 
                                                          
 155.  Wright, 224 P.3d at 1167 (quoting Beier, supra note 9, at 299). 
 156.  See id. (“There is no error under the Timley alternative means rule here, because the 
evidence of each means of committing rape—by force or fear or by unconsciousness—was sufficient 
to uphold a guilty verdict on the rape charge.”). 
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unproved by the state.  Rightfully so.  “Or” is a conjunction used to indicate 
an alternative.
157
  An attorney representing a criminal defendant on appeal 
would be remiss to not seize upon such a universal definition of this well-
known conjunction in the English language, applying it on a client’s behalf 
to the holding of Wright.  When interpreting statutes, “ordinary words [are to 
be given] their ordinary meaning[s].”
158
 
For a time, the Kansas Court of Appeals engaged in the enterprise of 
determining whether or not a case was an alternative means case without an 
enhanced definition from the Kansas Supreme Court.  The original working 
definition of an “alternative means case” as recognized by the Kansas 
Supreme Court merely amounts to an acknowledgement that a “single 
offense may be committed in more than one way.”
159
  The court noted, 
though, that while this definition is “straightforward on its face[, it is] mind-
bending in its application, [and] has led to confusion and disagreement 
among panels of the Court of Appeals.”
160
  The problem Kansas courts were 
encountering is that, in searching for the legislature’s objectively manifested 
expression of distinction between statutory theories, some requiring super 
sufficiency and some not, the Kansas Court of Appeals encountered no 
statutory guideposts; the idea there existed two classes of elements was 
simply not covered by the legislature.
161
   
As aptly put by an English jurist, “[e]ffect cannot be given to an 
unenacted intention.  So, judges are not supposed to give effect to an 
intention which Parliament would have had if it had thought about it, which 
it did not.”
162
  Different panels of the Kansas Court of Appeals reached 
inconsistent outcomes on exactly the same issues,
163
 not because of 
                                                          
 157.  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 873 (2d Coll. ed. 1982); BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1205 (6th ed. 1990). 
 158.  State v. Coman, 273 P.3d 701, 707 (Kan. 2012) (citing State v. Urban, 239 P.3d 837, 839 
(Kan. 2010)).  
 159.  State v. Timley, 875 P.2d 242, 246 (Kan. 1994). 
 160.  State v. Brown, 284 P.3d 977, 987 (Kan. 2012) (citations omitted).  
    161.  See id. at 991-92 (describing the process for determining legislative intent but making 
no mention of direct expression of legislative intent in statute). 
 162.  Lord Millet, Construing Statutes, 20 STATUTE LAW REV. 107, 110 (1999). 
 163.  Compare State v. Foster, 264 P.3d 116, 122–23 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (concluding use of 
terms “made,” “altered,” or “endorsed” in the forgery statute, K.S.A. 21-3710(a), did not create 
alternative means), rev. granted in part, No. 104,083 (Kan. Feb. 17, 2012), with State v. Owen, 251 
P.3d 673, 2011 WL 2039738, at *4–5 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (unpublished table decision) (concluding 
those terms did create alternative means of committing forgery), rev. granted, No. 102,814 (Kan. 
Feb. 17, 2012).  Compare State v. Perkins, 257 P.3d 1283, 1288–89 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) 
(concluding driving while cancelled, suspended, or revoked are alternative ways of violating K.S.A. 
8-262), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 290 P.3d 636 (2012), with State v. Suter, 2011 WL 2039739, at 
*13 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (unpublished table decision) (concluding that there is only one means of 
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wrestling with an ambiguity, but because the courts were wrestling with 
policy-making choices about which elements require super sufficiency and 
which do not—a mind-bending endeavor for any court.
164
  When the Kansas 
courts encounter mere ambiguities in statutes, courts sometimes resort to 
legislative history.
165
  But it is hard to imagine any legislature creating a trail 
of legislative evidence of its intent to create two classes of elements within 
the Kansas penal code, those requiring super sufficiency and those which do 
not.  Not surprisingly, none exists. 
In State v. Brown, the Kansas Supreme Court constructed a definition of 
alternative means to help courts discern which elements require super 
sufficiency and which elements do not.
166
  The court in Brown explained that 
“[i]dentifying an alternative means statute is more complicated than spotting 
the word ‘or’” within a statutory provision.
167
  The court stated: 
The listing of alternative distinct, material elements, when incorporated 
into an elements instruction, creates an alternative means issue 
demanding super-sufficiency of the evidence.  But merely describing a 
material element or a factual circumstance that would prove the crime 




The court noted that the “legislature will signal its intent to state 
alternative means through structure, separating alternatives into distinct 
subsections of the same statute.”
169
  But there are no hard and fast rules: 
 Regardless of such subsection design, however, a legislature may 
list additional alternatives or options within one alternative means of 
                                                          
violating K.S.A. 8-262), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 290 P.3d 620 (Kan. 2012).  Compare State v. 
Boyd, 268 P.3d 1210, 1215–16 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (aiding and abetting creates an alternative 
means) with State v. Snover, 287 P.3d 943, 947–48 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (aiding and abetting does 
not create alternative means).  See also State v. Clary, 270 P.3d 1206, 1210 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) 
(quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3420(c) (repealed 2010)) (resulting in a two-to-one decision 
regarding whether K.S.A. 21-3420(c) created an alternative means of kidnapping through use of 
phrase “to inflict bodily injury or to terrorize the victim or another”). 
 164.  See PATRICK DEVLIN, THE JUDGE 15–16 (1979) (“Five judges are no more likely to agree 
than five philosophers upon the philosophy behind an Act of Parliament and five different judges are 
likely to have five different ideas about the right escape route from the prison of the text.”). 
 165.  State v. Trautloff, 217 P.3d 15, 18–19 (Kan. 2009) (“It is only if the statutory language or 
text is unclear or ambiguous that the court moves to the next analytical step . . . relying on legislative 
history to construe the statute to give effect to the legislature’s intent.”). 
 166.  Brown, 284 P.3d at 991–92. 
 167.  Id. at 988.  
 168.  Id. (citing State v. Wright, 224 P.3d 1159, 1164 (Kan. 2010); State v. Peterson, 230 P.3d 
588, 591 (Wash. 2010) (en banc)).  
 169.  Id. at 990 (citing State v. Smith, 154 P.3d 873, 876–77 (Wash. 2007) (en banc)). 
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committing the crime.  But these options within an alternative do not 
constitute further alternative means themselves if they do not state 
additional and distinct ways of committing the crime, that is, if they do 




The court used the phrase “options within a means” to describe such a 




In other words, “or” connects “alternatives” and “options.”
172
  The 
outcome of an alternative means case in which the language after an “or” in 
a jury instruction was not proven by the state will depend upon the court’s 
distinction between an alternative and a mere option within an alternative. 
C.  The Renewed Struggle of Applying the Alternative Means Definition 
With a criminal code full of potential options or alternatives, the court 
has begun the post-Brown process of settling into a different level of 
generality in verdicts.  The Kansas Supreme Court has proceeded on a 
statute by statute basis, using Brown’s definition as the tool of discernment 
between the two different classes of elements in Kansas.  Remember, 
different means require super sufficiency while options within a means 
simply describe how that means could come about and do not require super 
sufficiency. 
 Regarding aggravated battery, the court held that “great bodily 
harm to another person or disfigurement of another person” 
does not create an alternative means case,  despite its pre-
Brown holding to the contrary.
173
  The court also held that 
“recklessly causing bodily harm to [another person]” (1) “with 
a deadly weapon, or” (2) “in any manner whereby great bodily 
harm, disfigurement, or death can be inflicted,” were not 
                                                          
 170.  Id.  
 171.  Id. at 990 (citing Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 636 n.6 (1991); McKoy v. North 
Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 n.5 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Peterson, 230 P.3d at 590–92; 
Beier, supra note 9, at 290 n.84).   
 172.  The Washington Supreme Court engages in a similar analysis, though it does not bother 
with using the synonym “options,” calling scenarios when super sufficiency is not required a “means 
within a means.”  Brown, 284 P.3d at 990 (citing Smith, 154 P.3d at 787).   
 173.  State v. Ultreras, 295 P.3d 1020, 1034 (Kan. 2013) (discussing K.S.A. § 21-3414(a)(2)(A) 
(repealed 2010)); State v. Kelly, 942 P.2d 579, 583–84 (Kan. 1997) (discussing K.S.A. § 21-
3414(a)(2)(A)). 
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alternative means of committing aggravated battery.
174
 
 The phrase “operate or attempt to operate” does not constitute 
“alternative means of committing” the offense of driving under 
the influence (DUI), even though just five years earlier the 
court held that “operate or attempt to operate” did create an 
“alternative means of committing” a DUI.
175
 
 The language “canceled, suspended or revoked” does not 
“create three means” of driving while suspended.
176
  In so 
finding, the court summarized the “actus reus” of driving while 
suspended—K.S.A. 8-262—as “driving without a privilege to 
do so,”
177
 blurring the distinction between the separate crimes 
of driving while suspended and driving without a valid 
license—K.S.A. 8-235—previously recognized by the court.
178
 
 Regarding aggravated intimidation of a witness, the language, 
“preventing or dissuading, or attempting to prevent or dissuade” 
was found to “not contain . . . alternative means.”
179
 
 Under the rape statute, “‘force or fear’ is a single, unified 
means of committing rape,” despite Timley’s pre-Brown 
holding to the contrary.
180
 
 Regarding sodomy: “oral contact of genitalia,” “anal 
penetration,” and “sexual intercourse with an animal” are 
alternative means.
181
  However, the “oral contact or oral 
penetration of the female genitalia or oral contact of the male 
genitalia” language constitutes mere options within a means.
182
 
 Under the felony murder statute, the phrase, “in the commission 
                                                          
 174.  Ultreras, 295 P.3d at 1036. 
 175.  Compare State v. Ahrens, 290 P.3d 629, 636 (Kan. 2012), with State v. Stevens, 172 P.3d 
570, 577–79 (Kan. 2007), abrogated by Brown, 284 P.3d 977. 
 176.  State v. Suter, 290 P.3d 620, 628 (Kan. 2012). 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  See State v. Bowie, 999 P.2d 947, 952 (Kan. 2000) (stating that “a person who never had a 
driver’s license cannot be charged with driving while suspended pursuant to [§] 8-262 but can be 
charged with driving without a license in violation of [§] 8-235(a)”).  It should be noted that since 
Bowie, the statute was amended to cover persons whose “privilege to obtain a driver’s license is 
suspended or revoked.”  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-262(a)(1) (2013).  This, however, does not eliminate 
the primary distinction between the two crimes.  
 179.  State v. Aguirre, 290 P.3d 612, 614 (Kan. 2012). 
 180.  Compare State v. Brooks, 265 P.3d 1175, 1184 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011), rev. granted, No. 
102,452 (Kan. June 13, 2012), with State v. Timley, 875 P.2d 242, 246 (Kan. 1994). 
 181.  State v. Burns, 287 P.3d 261, 272–73 (Kan. 2012) (discussing K.S.A. § 21-3501(2) 
(repealed 2010)), overruled on other grounds by State v. King, 305 P.3d 641 (Kan. 2013). 
 182.  State v. Wells, 290 P.3d 590, 604–05 (Kan. 2012) (discussing K.S.A. § 21-3501(2)). 
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of, attempting to commit, or in flight from . . . an inherently 
dangerous felony” merely creates options within a means, and 
super sufficiency is not required.
183
 
 For aggravated robbery, the phrase “taking property from the 
‘person or presence’” of another in a jury instruction merely 
creates “two options used to describe different factual 
circumstances in which aggravated robbery (or robbery) can 
occur.”
184
  Consequently, the state need only prove “property 
was taken from the presence of the victims,” super sufficiency 
of the evidence is not required; that is, the state is not required 
to prove the property was taken from the body of the person, 
when both options are left in the instructions.
185
  However, 
when the facts only support the presence option, a conviction 
obtained exclusively under the more restrictive person option 
will likely be reversed for insufficient evidence because of the 




 Under the kidnapping statute, the “[f]acilitation of flight and 
facilitation of the commission of a crime are mere options 
within a means.”
187
  The terms “taking or confining” do 
constitute alternative means of kidnapping, but the terms “by 
force, threat, or deception” are mere options within a means,
188
 




                                                          
 183.  State v. Harris, 306 P.3d 282, 292 (Kan. 2013) (discussing K.S.A. § 21-3401(b) (repealed 
2010)).  See also State v. Cheffen, 303 P.3d 1261, 1269 (Kan. 2013) (same finding, also discussing 
K.S.A. § 21-3401(b)).   
 184.  State v. Jackson, 305 P.3d 685, 697–98 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013).  
 185.  Id. at 699. 
 186.  See State v. Robinson, 8 P.3d 51, 54–55 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (citing State v. Little, 994 
P.2d 645, 650–51 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999)) (holding there is a fundamental difference between the  
“presence” language and the “person” language in reversing robbery conviction for taking property 
from a person when the only evidence supported the “presence” language).  It should be noted that 
the “presence” language subsumes the “person” language because taking property from the “person” 
will always involve taking the property from the victim’s presence.  Prosecutors keen on this point 
might consider guarding against being caught off guard here by either always including the 
“presence” language, or only using the presence language in their complaints.  Generally speaking, 
however, the shotgun approach to charging—assuming some of the means are not relevant to the 
facts—causes more alternative means problems than it solves. 
 187.  State v. Haberlein, 290 P.3d 640, 649 (Kan. 2012) (discussing K.S.A. § 21-3420(b) 
(repealed 2010)). 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  State v. Johnson, 11 P.3d 67, 69 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000), abrogated by State v. Clary, 270 
P.3d 1206, 1211 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012). 
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Thus, criminal defense attorneys should note, even if there actually was 
potential for some jurors to convict a defendant on a factually inadequate 
theory that their client accomplished a kidnapping by deception, it would not 
necessarily matter because that element is an option, and does not require 
super sufficiency.
190
  Just like the old common law Grissom/Griffin rule, it is 
enough if the evidence is sufficient to support either of the other two 
options, force or threat.
191
 
Contrast the scenario in the previous paragraph with what the appellate 
court held when it applied Wright to determine there was an alternative 
means error in State v. Shaw.
192
  The Shaw court overturned a DUI 
manslaughter conviction because a stray means of committing DUI 
manslaughter—causing death while “in flight from” a DUI—made its way 
into the instructions.
193
  In Shaw, the only evidence presented was that the 
defendant, over the legal limit of .08, turned into a motorcyclist, killing 
him.
194
  The defendant did not flee the scene of the collision and was 
required to provide a blood sample for blood-alcohol level testing.
195
  
Because there was no evidence the defendant was “in flight from” a DUI 
when he killed the victim, the conviction was overturned for lack of super 
sufficiency of the evidence.
196




A short time after denying review in Shaw, the Kansas Supreme Court 
held that the phrase, “in . . . flight from an inherently dangerous felony” was 
a mere option within a means of committing felony murder, and, thus, does 
                                                          
 190.  See Haberlein, 290 P.3d at 649 (“But the phrase ‘force, threat, or deception’ addresses 
secondary matter, merely describing ways in which the actus reus can be accomplished.  In other 
words, under our Brown analysis, each is an option within the means of taking or confining.”). 
 191.  See id. (citing State v. Brown, 284 P.3d 977 (Kan. 2012); State v. Wright, 224 P.3d 1159 
(Kan. 2010); State v. Timley, 875 P.2d 242 (Kan. 1994)) (“Force, threat, and deception are not 
alternative means of committing a kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping, and we need not reach the 
question of whether sufficient proof of each was presented to Haberlein’s jury.”). 
 192.  281 P.3d 576, 582–84 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012), rev. denied, No. 11-106015-A, 2013 Kan. 
LEXIS 478 (May 20, 2013).  Shaw was decided about a month before Brown was published.  
However, the Kansas Supreme Court denied review in Shaw well after Brown.  
 193.  Id. at 583–84.  The reader might logically ask: how is it possible to be in flight from a DUI 
without continuing to drive while under the influence of alcohol or drugs?  Flight on foot, or even 
horseback, spring to mind. 
 194.  Id. at 578–80. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. at 585–86. 
 197.  Id.  However, in a concurring opinion, Judge Malone expressed his view that “alternative 
means error, like almost every other kind of trial error, should be subject to harmless error analysis.”  
Id. at 586 (Malone, J., concurring).   
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not require super sufficiency.
198
  If there is a distinction between “in flight 
from a DUI” and “in flight from an inherently dangerous felony” when it 
comes to labeling these comparable phrases “options” or “alternatives” 
under Brown’s paradigm, the author is incapable of conjuring one with a 
scintilla of merit. 
D.  Brown’s Appellate Consequences 
Brown’s analytical framework presents unique challenges for appellate 
counsel.  When the legislature describes an element or a factual 
circumstance that would prove a crime, words that add anything to what is 
prohibited could result in being labeled a distinct and additional way of 
committing the crime.
199
  If the words are redundant and already mean the 
same thing, the actual facts of any given case would prove both ways of 
committing the crime, or neither.
200
  When this is the situation, should the 
case not be resolved on the basis that there is either super sufficiency or 
insufficient evidence?  And if there is a strange case in which one of the 
options or means or ways does not fit the facts and cannot be sufficiently 
proved, is this not the identical evil Wright was aiming to prevent? 
The Brown court addresses this concern by quoting the United States 
Supreme Court in Schad v. Arizona: “Decisions about what facts are 
material and what are immaterial, or . . . what ‘fact[s] [are] necessary to 
constitute the crime,’ and therefore must be proved individually, and what 
facts are mere means, represent value choices more appropriately made in 
the first instance by a legislature than by a court.” 
201
 
But the issue in Schad was whether or not states should be allowed to 
define the single crime of first degree murder as provable by either of two 
alternatives: premeditated murder or felony murder.
202
  The defendant in 
Schad argued premeditated murder and felony murder are inherently 
separate crimes, and should not be allowed to exist as alternative ways of 
                                                          
 198.  State v. Harris, 306 P.3d 282, 292 (Kan. 2013); State v. Cheffen, 303 P.3d 1261, 1269 
(Kan. 2013). 
 199.  See State v. Sedillos, 112 P.3d 854, 859–60 (Kan. 2005) (stating that the rules of statutory 
construction attempt to avoid rendering statutory language meaningless or superfluous). 
 200.  Except, of course, when the language of one part of a statute subsumes the other.  For 
example, in a robbery case, when property is taken from the “person” of another, that property will 
necessarily always be taken from the persons “presence.”  The “presence” language subsumes the 
“person” language.   
 201.  State v. Brown, 284 P.3d 977, 988 (Kan. 2012) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 638 (1991)). 
 202.  Schad, 501 U.S. at 627. 
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proving the one crime of first degree murder.
203
 
Indeed, the Schad court prefaced the quotation above with this assertion: 
“Judicial restraint necessarily follows from a recognition of the impossibility 
of determining, as an a priori matter, whether a given combination of facts is 
consistent with there being only one offense.”
204
  In context, the quote first 
and foremost stands for the proposition that the legislature is free to 
construct alternative means crimes as it sees fit, provided the legislature does 
not define crimes in a way that “risks serious unfairness and lacks support in 
history or tradition.”
205
  Second, Schad has to be read in light of the 
centuries-old alternative means common law rule followed in Griffin that 
same year.  If a legislature made felony murder a “mere means” of 
committing first degree murder, it would not necessarily have to be proven 




Brown was an aggravated indecent liberties case involving a grown man 
sleeping naked with an eight-year-old girl, touching her privates, rubbing 
lotion all over her body, and kissing her on her breasts.
207
  Brown focused on 
K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A), which prohibits lewd touching of a child under 
fourteen “done or submitted to with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual 
desires of either the child or the offender, or both.”
208
  The court rejected the 
defendant’s argument that the state was required to prove he intended to 
arouse the sexual desires of both himself and the child, stating, “it is unlikely 
that the legislature intended for options within a means to constitute 
alternative means subject to the super-sufficiency requirement.”
209
  Yes, that 
is unlikely.  Without belaboring the point, it is unlikely because Kansas 
adopted the common law by legislative enactment, which would have 
                                                          
 203.  Id. at 630–31. 
 204.  Id. at 638.   
 205.  Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 820 (1999) (citing Schad, 501 U.S. at 632–33). 
 206.  Many states have adopted the rule from Schad regarding jury unanimity for alternative 
means crimes. See State v. Jones, 29 P.3d 351, 376 (Haw. 2001) (Ramil, J., concurring) (“Schad is 
widely understood to stand . . . for the proposition that the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution does not require jury unanimity on alternative means of proving a single offense.”).  See 
also State v. Derango, 613 N.W.2d 833, 841 (Wis. 2000); State v. Nunez, 981 P.2d 738, 744 (Idaho 
1999) (misuse of public monies); Ex parte Madison, 718 So. 2d 104, 106–07 (Ala. 1998) (capital 
murder); People v. Rand, 683 N.E.2d 1243, 1249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (stalking); State v. St. Pierre, 
693 A.2d 1137, 1139 (Me. 1997) (unlawful sexual conduct); State v. Salazar, 945 P.2d 996, 1006 
(N.M. 1997) (first degree murder); Richardson v. State, 673 A.2d 144, 146–47 (Del. 1996) 
(kidnapping and robbery). 
 207.  Brown, 284 P.3d at 984. 
 208.  Id. at 992 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3504(a)(3)(A) (Repealed 2010)). 
 209.  Id. 
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included the Grissom/Griffin rule, not to mention that the super sufficiency 
requirement sprung from the verdict procedure statute through language not 
readily evident. 
But that is not the Brown court’s rationale which, in keeping with 
Wright’s precedent, now necessarily assumes a legislative intent to create a 
super sufficiency requirement.  Having created the super sufficiency rule, 
Brown switches gears and points to legislative intent to avoid application of 
its rule to all the statutory ways crimes can be proven in Kansas.  The court 
held the language “‘either the child or the offender, or both’ merely 
describes a secondary matter, the potential yet incidental objects of the 
offender’s required intent,”
210
 which for murder would be the intent to kill a 
human being, but for this crime is the intent to arouse the sexual desires of 
the defendant or the child.  While the court calls the statutory language 
completing this intent element secondary, make no mistake, the crime is not 
complete until the state has proved the touching was done with the intent to 
arouse the sexual desires of one of two people in the world, the victim or the 
defendant.
211
  The language that completes the intent element is secondary in 
the sense it does not require super sufficiency, not in the sense that facts 
supporting one or the other of the options are immaterial and unnecessary to 
constitute the crime. 
Brown’s class-system-for-elements holding seems born of the need for a 
tool to save fairly-achieved convictions from harmless errors, not from any 
principled or foreseeable construction of Kansas statutes.  In her concurrence 
in Brown, Justice Moritz stated her concern this way: “I am concerned that 




If Wright were overturned, Brown’s class-system-for-elements holding 
would be more than just textually unsupported; it would be obsolete.  
Ordinary adherence to Kansas’s canons of construction in this area of the 
law simplifies and clarifies this unnecessarily complicated area of the state’s 
jurisprudence. 
 
                                                          
 210.  Id. at  993. 
 211.  Brown could quite easily have been resolved on the basis that there was super sufficiency.  
A jury with common knowledge about human sexuality would understand that the defendant’s 
primary purpose in fondling a child’s privates is to arouse his own sexual desires.  But the jury could 
also reasonably infer that the defendant intended to arouse the child by fondling her privates for the 
principal purpose of further enhancing his own arousal. 
 212.  Brown, 284 P.3d at 1001 (Mortiz, J., concurring). 
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IV.  REPLACING WRIGHT’S MISBEGOTTEN RULE USING KANSAS’S 
CANONS OF TEXTUAL CONSTRUCTION 
If ordinary application of Kansas’s canons of statutory and 
constitutional construction can show Wright and Brown were wrongly 
decided, continued fidelity to these established conventions of statutory and 
constitutional interpretation should prove useful in leading to their 
replacement.  Admittedly, application of these conventions will not always 
inoculate us from being perplexed by all legal knots, but their application 
keeps us tethered to a stable framework. 
Here, we have three ways of resolving our issue of replacing Wright and 
Brown: Cook’s application of the clearly erroneous exception for 
instructions which have not been objected to from 2008;
213
 Grissom’s 
application of the centuries-old common law rule that evidentiary support 
for a single means is sufficient from 1992;
214
 and Dixon’s application of the 
harmless error rule in 2005.
215
  Each rule comes from a statute: Cook’s rule 
for un-objected to instructions comes from K.S.A. 22-3414(3); Grissom’s 
rule comes to us through K.S.A. 77-109’s adoption of the common law; and 
Dixon’s harmless error rule comes from K.S.A. 60-2105. 
A.  Cook’s Application of the Clear Error Statute for Un-objected to 
Instructions 
If any advocate gets the Kansas Supreme Court interested in overruling 
Wright, they should be leery of asking the court to apply K.S.A. 22-
3414(3)’s clearly erroneous exception for instructions which have not been 
objected to in its place.  The reason: to maintain consistency.  Courts have 
construed K.S.A. 22-3414(3) to contain rules not readily found there in the 
same way that they have construed the verdict procedure statute’s use of the 
word “any” to protect super sufficiency.
216
  In relevant part, K.S.A. 22-
3414(3) states: “[n]o party may assign as error the giving . . . [of] an 
instruction . . . unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to 
consider its verdict stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects 
and the grounds of the objection unless the instruction . . . is clearly 
                                                          
 213.  State v. Cook, 191 P.3d 294, 301 (Kan. 2008). 
 214.  State v. Grissom, 840 P.2d 1142, 1171 (Kan. 1992). 
 215.  State v. Dixon, 112 P.3d 883 (Kan. 2005). 
 216.  See, e.g., State v. Carter, 160 P.3d 457, 467 (Kan. 2007) (quoting State v. Bell, 121 P.3d 
972, 977 (Kan. 2005)) (un-objected to instructions will only be considered “clearly erroneous” under 
K.S.A. 22-3414(3) if the “reviewing court is firmly convinced there is a real possibility that the jury 
would have rendered a different verdict if the error had not occurred”).  
  




The case that originally and inexplicably construed K.S.A. 22-3414(3)’s 
“clearly erroneous exception from a certainty-of-error concept to a certainty-
of-prejudice concept” was State v. Stafford.
218
  Advocates asking the court to 
apply the clearly erroneous statute in an attempt to overrule Wright run the 
unnecessary risk of appearing patently inconsistent—applying a textual 
approach to debunk Wright, then utilizing Stafford’s inventive construction 
of another statute to replace it. 
The risk of appearing patently inconsistent under these circumstances is 
unnecessary.  First, advocates have a harmless error statute on the books 
which is very similar to Stafford’s clearly prejudicial invention.  If your case 
depends on whatever advantage can be gained by the court retaining 
Stafford’s decades-old inventive construction of the clear error exception 
despite the more general harmless error statute, you have already lost.  
Second, advocates can argue a return to the Grissom precedent, which 
eschews application of either statute. 
This is not to say the Stafford precedent should not be dealt with one 
way or the other—after all, it is precedent that must be dealt with in some 
way by the court if Wright is overturned.  K.S.A. 22-3414(3), at least as 
construed by courts, is the more specific statute for the situation of an un-
objected to jury instruction than the more general harmless error statute.  But 
the canon of statutory construction stating that statutes “relating to a specific 
thing[] take precedence over general statutes” can logically only apply after 
giving the plain words of a statute their fair meaning.
219
  From looking at the 
text, the legislature did not create a mini-harmless error statute within K.S.A. 
22-3414(3).
220
  The Kansas Supreme Court knows this well, having recently 
stated: “[T]here is nothing in the statutory language which would naturally 
lead one to the conclusion that ‘clearly erroneous’ was meant to be 




It’s not just the sentence-level text of K.S.A. 22-3414(3) that militates 
against reading a “clearly-prejudicial” requirement into the statute.  The 
context of this statute’s codification militates against such an inventive 
                                                          
 217.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3414(3) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 218.  State v. Williams, 286 P.3d 195, 201 (Kan. 2012) (analyzing the origin of the judicially-
created, clearly-prejudicial construction of the statute and finding it to have started in State v. 
Stafford, 573 P.2d 970, 972–73 (Kan. 1977)). 
 219.  Chelsea Plaza Homes, Inc. v. Moore, 601 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Kan. 1979). 
 220.  § 22-3414(3). 
 221.  Williams, 286 P.3d at 201. 
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reading as well.  The clearly erroneous rule predates the statute codifying it.  
Prior to the codification of the rule, the Kansas Supreme Court had 
consistently held that the clear error rule did not estop appellants from 
challenging erroneous instructions by failing to object at the time they were 
given.
222
  Since K.S.A. 22-3414(3) does not define “clearly erroneous,” and 
that phrase had already received authoritative construction by the Kansas 
Supreme Court, K.S.A. 22-3414(3)’s “clearly erroneous” rule should have 
been understood according to its prior construction.
223
  The Kansas Supreme 




What is perplexing about the way K.S.A. 22-3414(3) has been construed 
since Stafford, is that there is not even a need for the inventive construction; 
that is, there is nothing compelling on the surface one could point to as the 
motivation for a court to look for an escape route from the text of the statute, 
or the context of its codification.  The text of the legislature’s harmless error 
statute accomplishes the task performed by the Stafford invention nicely.
225
  
Just as real complex knots in your Christmas lights sometimes resolve all at 
once, perhaps the court can correct Wright and Stafford simultaneously. 
B.  Grissom’s Application of the Centuries-Old Common Law Rule 
It may seem reasonable to conclude that the rule adopted by the Kansas 
Supreme Court in Grissom, which follows the common law rule adopted 
through K.S.A. 77-109, is the only textually supportable alternative to 
replace Wright.  The rule that statutes have not been interpreted as changing 
                                                          
 222.  See Sams v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co, 139 P.2d 859, 866 (Kan. 1943).  See also 
Richardson v. Bus. Men’s Protective Ass’n., 284 P. 599, 602 (Kan. 1930) (stating that when an 
instruction includes statements of law which are “clearly erroneous,” it is not necessary, in order for 
a party to predicate error upon the giving of the instruction, to make objection); State v. Ragland, 
246 P.2d 276, 279–80 (Kan. 1952) (“[I]t is not necessary in order to predicate error thereon, that a 
defendant in a criminal action object to the giving of an instruction to the jury, if the instruction is 
clearly erroneous.”); Collet v. Estate of Schnell, 397 P.2d 402, 405 (Kan. 1964) (“This court adheres 
to the rule that where the instructions or directions of the trial court are in themselves erroneous, an 
appellant is not estopped of complaining of them as error by not having objected at the time they 
were given.”). 
 223.  ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS, 322 (2012) (“If a word or phrase has been authoritatively interpreted by the highest court in a 
jurisdiction, or has been given a uniform interpretation by inferior courts . . . a later version of that 
act perpetuating the wording is presumed to carry forward that interpretation.”).   
 224.  See State v. Johnson, 522 P.2d 330, 334 (Kan. 1974) (finding when parental “unfitness” is 
not defined by statute, the court construes “unfit” pursuant to its prior construction). 
 225.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2105 (2012). 
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the common law unless explicitly provided
226
 might, at first blush, debunk 
Dixon’s ruling as easily as Wright’s ruling because Dixon’s starting point is 
the same as Wright’s—Timley’s super sufficiency rule—and this starting 
point is in clear derogation of the common law.
227
  Grissom’s centuries-old 
common law rule neither requires super sufficiency nor contemplates a 
harmless error analysis because harmless error reform in this country did not 
occur until early in the twentieth century.
228
 
It appears that common law courts felt so strongly about the innocuous 
nature of alternative means error in general that they crafted a common law 
presumption against the general idea that any error, no matter how 
inconsequential, was presumed to be prejudicial.
229
  The presumption was 
that an alternative means “error” when one means is not factually supported 
is not an error at all, and that the jury always convicted on the factually 
supported means.  This inference seems reasonable given the nature of some 
of the alternative means errors found harmless by Kansas appellate courts.  
Notably, Grissom did not apply harmless error analysis, which was 
consistent with the centuries-old common law rule while being somewhat 
inconsistent with the harmless error reform that occurred in this country just 
after the turn of the twentieth century. 
C.  Dixon’s Application of the Harmless Error Statute 
In Kansas, harmless error reform dates back at least to the general 
session laws of 1909.
230
  The 1909 harmless error statute is identical to the 
one currently in effect, which states: 
The appellate court shall disregard all mere technical errors and 
                                                          
 226. See Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Carter, 184 P.3d 273, 277 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (“[W]hen 
the legislature has intended to abolish a common-law rule, it has done so in an explicit manner.  In 
the absence of such an expression of legislative intent, the common law remains part of our law.”).  
 227.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 228.  See Wiseman v. Armstrong, 989 A.2d 1027, 1034 (Conn. 2010) (“Before the harmless 
error reform, the American legal system had followed what was known in the English courts as the 
‘Exchequer Rule,’ which created the presumption that prejudice accompanies every trial court error 
and new trials were required to remedy all instances of error.  As one scholar noted: ‘[T]he 
American courts did not change the rule and even in the early twentieth century were still leaving no 
error unremedied, no matter how inconsequential . . . .”) (quoting S. Goldberg, Harmless Error: 
Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 422 (1980)).  See also ROGER J. 
TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 3 (1970) (“There was a time in the law, extending into 
our own century, when no error was lightly forgiven.  In that somber age of technicality the slightest 
error in a trial could spoil the judgment.”). 
 229.  See Wiseman, 989 A.2d at 1034. 
 230.  Laws 1909, ch. 182, § 581 (1909) (recodified as K.S.A. § 60-2105 (2012)). 
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irregularities which do not affirmatively appear to have prejudicially 
affected the substantial rights of the party complaining, where it 
appears upon the whole record that substantial justice has been done by 
the judgment or order of the trial court; and in any case pending before 
it, the court shall render such final judgment as it deems that justice 
requires, or direct such judgment to be rendered by the court from 
which the appeal was taken, without regard to technical errors and 
irregularities in the proceedings of the trial court.
231
   
The question here is: Does this harmless error statute replace the 
common law’s more rigid, one-dimensional presumption that juries convict 
on the factually supported theory?  The short answer: Yes. 
K.S.A. 77-109 adopts the common law as modified by “statutory 
law.”
232
  K.S.A. 77-109 sets forth that “such statutes shall be liberally 
construed to promote their object,” and are not to be “strictly construed” 
when in “derogation” of the common law.
233
  As alluded to earlier in this 
article, the language of K.S.A. 77-109 contradicts the case law’s requirement 
that the change in the common law must be explicit.
234
  Requiring a change 
to be “explicit” seems equivalent to the “strict construction”
235
 prohibited by 
the statute.  Fairly read, K.S.A. 77-109 only requires that any change be 
clear.
236
  Applying this method of construction to the harmless error statute, 
the statute’s object is to direct appellate courts to review the “whole record” 
in individual cases in an attempt to distinguish between errors which are 
merely technical and those which affect the substantial rights of a party.  The 
harmless error statute does not speak in terms of starting off with any 
abstract presumptions like the state would have enjoyed under Grissom.  
Instead, the statute imposes a duty on the court to take a holistic approach to 
individual cases and exercise judgment, eschewing abstract assumptions 
such as: jurors always convict on the theory supported by the evidence;
237
 or 
                                                          
 231.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2105 (2012). 
 232.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-109 (2012). 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  See supra Part III.A.2. 
 235.  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 145 at 355 (explaining that “in the 19th century, a ‘strict’ 
construction came to mean a narrow, crabbed reading of the text”). 
 236.  See Id. at 318. (footnotes omitted) (“It has often been said that statutes in derogation of the 
common law are to be strictly construed.  That is a relic of the courts’ historical hostility to the 
emergence of statutory law.  The better view is that statutes will not be interpreted as changing the 
common law unless they effect the change with clarity.  There is no more reason to reject a fair 
reading that changes the common law than there is to reject a fair reading that repeals a prior 
statute . . . . For both, the alteration of prior law must be clear—but it need not be express, nor 
should its clear implication be distorted.”). 
 237.  If this were always true, jurors would never find a defendant guilty based on insufficient 
evidence. 
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alternative means errors are always prejudicial.
238
  As the United States 
Supreme Court in Kotteakos explained, the object of developing the doctrine 
of harmless error was to: 
substitute judgment for automatic application of rules; to preserve 
review as a check upon arbitrary action and essential unfairness in 
trials, but at the same time to make the process perform that function 
without giving men fairly convicted the multiplicity of loopholes which 
any highly rigid and minutely detailed scheme of errors, especially in 
relation to procedure, will engender and reflect in a printed record.
239
 
As noted by the Kansas Supreme Court, the development of harmless 
error analysis and the applicable standards in Kansas tracks a similar history 
to that of the federal courts.
240
  
While Timley’s super sufficiency rule draws conclusions using 
Washington law, and the rationale for its holding has nothing to do with the 
harmless error statutes, analyzing cases for super sufficiency would 
necessarily be the first logical step in analyzing claims of alternative means 
error.  Indeed, if there is super sufficiency of the evidence, there is no error 
to analyze for harmlessness.  This is fundamentally different than requiring 
super sufficiency.  Dixon’s holding, that the alternative means error was 
harmless, by definition did not require super sufficiency.  Dixon simply 
applied the statute’s harmless error rule, not the common law rule’s more 
rigid, one-dimensional presumption. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
When a trial court makes an alternative means error in Kansas by 
allowing a jury the option of convicting a defendant on a factually 
inadequate statutory theory, the harmless error statute should apply no 
                                                          
 238.  Sometimes the stark difference between the several means of committing a crime would 
functionally guarantee the jury was not misled.  For instance, in a sodomy case, a jury hearing only 
evidence of oral sex perpetrated against a victim would have to be collectively delusional to be 
misled by the inclusion of the anal-sex or sex-with-an-animal alternatives in the instructions.  Yet, 
under the current law, that stark difference between means would be the very basis for reversal.  See 
State v. Burns, 287 P.3d 261, 272–73 (Kan. 2012) (stating that oral sex, anal sex, and animal sex are 
alternative means of committing sodomy).   
 239.  Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759–60 (1946). 
 240.  See State v. Ward, 256 P.3d 801, 811–13 (Kan. 2011).  See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-261 
(2012) (“Unless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding evidence, or any other 
error by the court or a party, is ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict or for 
vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order.  At every stage of the proceeding, 
the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party’s substantial rights.” 
(emphasis added)).   
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matter how Brown’s judicially-enhanced definition of alternative means 
might classify the elements in question.  Brown’s class-system-for-elements 
holding lacks textual foundation in Kansas law and is an insufficient 
substitute for the harmless error statute.  Indeed, Brown’s regime, taken at 
face value, does not even pretend to claim any utility for sorting harmful 
errors from harmless ones.  Only sheer luck—or a surreptitious glance at the 
degree of harm actually at play—can connect harmless errors with an 
“option” finding and harmful errors with a “means” finding.  Without 
manipulation, Brown’s constructs serve to provide windfalls to those fairly 
convicted on the basis of undeniably innocuous “means” errors while 
routinely cutting off harmless error analysis in “option” error cases. 
In short, Brown’s class-system-for-elements regime supplanted what the 
legislature enacted—a statute calling for the courts to analyze and categorize 
error as either harmless or harmful.  Ironically, it is precisely the 
combination of Wright’s and Brown’s holdings which prevents application 
of the rightful “law of the land,” which is the predecessor term for “due 
process of law.”
241
  Ordinary adherence to canons of statutory construction 
simplifies and clarifies this unnecessarily complicated area of Kansas’s 
jurisprudence.  Dixon’s rule should be reinstated, but this time with the 
benefit of a principled justification based upon Kansas’s constitution and 
statutes.  Wright’s holding, barring harmless error analysis in alternative 
means cases, should be overruled because the decision is textually and 
historically wrong.  It permanently places the court in the position of 
applying judicially created constructs in place of the harmless error statute.  
Instead, courts should be applying harmless error analysis, which 




                                                          
 241.  See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 62 (1967) (Black, J., concurring) (“The phrase ‘due process of 
law’ has through the years evolved as the successor in purpose and meaning to the words ‘law of the 
land’ in Magna Charta . . . .”).   
 242. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 145 at 411–12 (footnotes omitted) (asserting that among 
the factors to consider for setting aside precedent  are “how clear it is that the decision was textually 
and historically wrong” and “whether the decision permanently places courts in the position of 
making policy calls appropriate for elected officials”).  If the legislature wanted to create the regime 
Brown has created, it could certainly have done so any number of ways, including publishing in red 
the primary elements which require super sufficiency and leaving secondary elements in plain black 
ink while setting forth the reason for the two-toned criminal code.  Any legislature sophisticated 
enough to create the highly nuanced class-system-for-elements regime that has emerged in the wake 
of Brown would certainly recognize the necessity of communicating this exotic intent in the text of 
its laws. 
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APPENDIX: HOW TO AVOID ALTERNATIVE MEANS ERROR AT TRIAL 
For trial judges and trial level prosecutors looking for the most 
abbreviated dose of usefulness from this article, here it is: kill the shotgun 
approach.  That is, edit out of the jury instructions all unproven statutory 
theories of guilt, whether these theories spring from elements instructions or 
from the definition of terms instructions.
243
  To some extent, Wright’s due 
process innovations are the result of a combination of phenomena.  The first 
is charging documents containing statutory theories in the Kansas penal code 
irrelevant to the respective facts of the crime charged.  The second is equal 
inattention of trial court judges in passing factually inadequate statutory 
theories on to juries for their consideration. 
Regardless of Kansas’s case law on this issue, trial judges still hold the 
key to avoiding alternative means error.  Meticulous attention to alternative 
means issues by trial courts when crafting jury instructions should result in 
the near extinction of cases in which a conviction is overturned for this type 
of error.
244
  At any given time, trial courts should realize that a significant 
number of prosecutors are brand new to the profession or are simply not 
cognizant of the complications they are sowing into their complaints.  These 
prosecutors tend to indiscriminately charge crimes in the all inclusive 
language of the statute in an effort to avoid the sometimes fatal error of 
having left out an element.  When a trial court limits its instructions to juries 
to include only those statutory means of committing crimes in which a 
rational juror might find there is sufficient evidence, there can be no 
                                                          
 243.  Some definitional sections have been categorized as an explanatory definition rather than a 
fundamental definition of the crime itself.  See State v. Waldrup, 263 P.3d 867, 879 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2011) (holding that “the district court’s definitional jury instruction of the term ‘sale’ did not create 
alternative means of committing the crime of sale of cocaine”).  See also State v. Britt, 287 P.3d 905, 
911–13 (Kan. 2012) (holding that the definition of sexual intercourse does not create alternative 
means).  But see State v. Burns, 287 P.3d 261, 272–73 (Kan. 2012) (holding that the complete 
definition of sodomy contains three alternative means: (1) oral contact of genitalia, (2) anal 
penetration, and (3) sexual intercourse with an animal), overruled on other grounds by State v. King, 
305 P.3d 641 (Kan. 2013). 
 244.  Perhaps the lone exception is alternative means analysis when applied to principles of 
criminal liability, such as aiding and abetting, which bring in to play complications for the trial court 
beyond simple vigilance in spotting and dealing with an issue.  It is common for there to be 
sufficient evidence to convict a defendant as either a principal or as an aider and abettor, with 
existing uncertainty as to a defendant’s precise involvement.  Panels of the Kansas Court of Appeals 
are split as to whether being charged as an aider and abettor or principal creates an alternative means 
scenario.  Compare State v. Boyd, 268 P.3d 1210, 1215–16 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that 
aiding and abetting creates an alternative means), petition for review filed January 23, 2012, with 
State v. Snover, 287 P.3d 943, 947–48 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that aiding and abetting does 
not create alternative means), petition for review filed December 10, 2012.   
  




District court judges bring with them to the bench strengths and 
weaknesses.  Prosecutors should know that not all trial judges have 
extensive criminal law backgrounds, and even if they do, they may not be 
attuned to alternative means issues.  Trial judges in Kansas, particularly in 
rural Kansas, tend to be jacks-of-all-trades, so it is especially important for 
prosecutors to know their craft and take the time to banish the parts of the 
penal law they know lack foundation in the complaint.  Then, prosecutors 
should re-evaluate the requested instructions after the presentation of all the 
evidence at trial to help the court make sure only those means for which 
there is sufficient evidence are submitted in the instructions.  It is helpful for 
prosecutors to think of their case as a glass of water they will have to drink 
on appeal.  Naturally, a prosecutor would not want to muddy the water she 
will be drinking. 
I.  RULES FOR DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 
A.  The Schreiner Temptation 
For defense attorneys, a thorough understanding of alternative means 
issues could result in temptation, that is, it could create an “incentive to salt 
jury instructions with language for alternative means on which no evidence 
had been submitted.”
246
  As noted by the Schreiner court: “A jury would be 
highly unlikely to convict on that means in the absence of evidence, so 
there would be little risk to a defendant.  But inclusion of that language 
in the actual instructions would provide grounds for an automatic 
reversal . . . in an appeal of a guilty verdict.”
247
 
Not wanting to encourage “that sort of connivance,” the Schreiner court 
found a defendant’s request for an instruction which included unproved 
means, which the court then gave to the jury, was an invited error, and the 
                                                          
 245.  If a trial judge is in doubt whether a particular means of committing a crime has been 
proven, the trial judge could guard against reversible error by calling for separate verdicts on the 
theories.  The jury would then be clear as to which theory it relied upon in reaching each verdict.  
However, if the State is actually able to sufficiently prove its weaker theory, this course of action by 
a trial court may prejudice the State.  That is because it is acceptable for juries to be split on the 
theory of guilt as long as sufficient evidence supports each theory.  State v. Wright, 224 P.3d 1159, 
1165 (Kan. 2010) (quoting State v. Timley, 875 P.2d 242, Sy. 1. (Kan. 1994)).  But if the prosecutor 
is eager to avoid application of the jurisprudence above and has reservations about how an appellate 
court may view his weaker theory, the prosecutor may actually welcome this approach to avoid the 
specter of retrial—particularly if the prosecutor views his stronger theory as a lead-pipe cinch.   
 246.  State v. Schreiner, 264 P.3d 1033, 1043 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011). 
 247.  Id. 
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court refused to overturn the conviction on that basis.
248
  But encountering 
instructions pre-salted by the court with alternative means error still presents 
a defense attorney with an ethical hazard—or, some might say, a strategic 
choice.
249
  Do you object to the instruction or hedge your bets and let it 




Those who would classify this as zealous advocacy focus on strategy.  
After all, what could be sounder trial strategy than a free run at acquittal 
with a guaranteed option of a do over?  When an advocate recognizes that 
the court has added irrelevant means to the jury instructions and passively 
allows the court to sow error into the trial for tactical advantage, the 
advocate is engaging in suppressio veri—a tacit lie.  However, like in 
Schreiner, almost all of the cases in which factually unsupported alternative 
means have slipped into instructions without objection, the lack of objection 
was probably due to oversight, not strategy. 
B.  Defense Attorneys Beware the Downside of Brown 
Defense attorneys should be aware that certain elements, or portions 
thereof, required to be proven by the state are now deemed “secondary 
matters.”
251
  These statutory secondary matters are called “options within a 
means.”
252
  Between two secondary options, even if there actually is 
legitimate concern of conviction based on a factually inadequate theory, it 
will not matter on appeal unless defendant’s appellate counsel can convince 
the Kansas Supreme Court to apply a harmless error analysis to the 
alternative options case.
253
  It is incumbent on defense counsel to understand 
this new landscape on which their clients’ cases are won or lost to protect 
                                                          
 248.  Id.  See also State v. Bailey, 255 P.3d 19, 27 (Kan. 2011) (“When defendant’s requested 
instruction is given to the jury, the defendant cannot complain the requested instruction was error on 
appeal.”). 
 249.  See KANSAS RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a) (2007) (“A lawyer shall not 
knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal . . . .”).  Is telling the court you 
have no objection to instructions in this scenario a violation if you know of the error?  Comment 2 of 
this rule states: “This Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid 
conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process.”  Id. at  cmt. 2. 
 250.  See Schreiner, 264 P.3d at 1043. 
 251.  See State v. Brown, 284 P.3d 977, 990–91 (Kan. 2012) (“Jury unanimity on options within 
a means—secondary matters—is generally unnecessary; therefore, on appeal, a super-sufficiency 
issue will not arise regarding whether there is sufficient evidence to support all options within a 
means.”). 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  Id. 
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their clients against options errors for which there is currently no recourse. 
 
